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LOST AND FOUND: DAVID HOFFMAN AND THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS
by
Michael Ariens *
Abstract
David Hoffman was a successful Baltimore lawyer who
wrote the first study of American law in 1817 and authored the
first maxims of American legal ethics. Yet for more than a century
after his death, Hoffman was a forgotten figure to American
lawyers. Beginning in the late 1970s, Hoffman was re-discovered,
and his writings on legal ethics have been favorably cited.
How and why was Hoffman “lost” to American law for
over a century, and why he was “found”? Hoffman was lost to
history because his view of ethics was premised on republican
virtue, specifically the concept of honor. A lawyer acted honorably
if his actions were morally sanctioned. Thus, Hoffman concluded a
lawyer should refuse to plead the statute of limitations because,
though legal, such action was dishonorable. When Hoffman wrote
his maxims of legal ethics, the concept of honor was being
displaced by individualism. The test of lawyer behavior became
private conscience rather than public honor. This turn was
accompanied by a second shift, in which lawyers accepted that
legal ethics differed from public morality. Though an “officer of
the court,” the lawyer’s foremost duty was to serve his client’s
private interests, and the lawyer was not morally accountable to
the public for the client’s goals. One consequence of these changes
was the profession’s agreement that lawyers owed a duty to their
clients to plead all legal claims and defenses. This vision left
Hoffman behind.
Hoffman was found in response to a crisis within the
modern American legal profession. By the late 1970s, many
lawyers feared that the liberal ideal of the lawyer as a morally
*Professor, St. Mary=s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Thanks to Al
Brophy, Steve Sheppard and Vincent Johnson for their many useful insights.
Thanks also to my research assistant Lauren Valkenaar, and to Brian Detweiler,
who found many of the documents cited in this essay.
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neutral, zealous agent (or “hired-gun”) effectuating a client’s
goals ignored the lawyer’s duties to the public. This crisis was
exacerbated by two events: Watergate, in which lawyers blindly
followed the demands of their client, the President, to society’s
detriment, and the ABA’s decision in 1978 to replace its 1969
Code of Professional Responsibility, because the Code embraced
the “fiction” that ethical issues were “matters of ethics rather than
law.” Because Hoffman concluded a lawyer’s duty to a client was
limited by his duties to society, he was used as a relevant,
historical example of an ethics of advocacy contrary to the
“standard conception” of liberal neutrality. Hoffman was a
touchstone justifying an ethics of virtue, of lawyers serving the
ends of justice, not merely serving their client’s goals.

I. Introduction
II. Baltimore and the History of Hoffman=s Resolutions
A. Baltimore, 1790-1812
B. The Baltimore Riots of 1812
C. Hoffman and Professional Deportment, 1810-1837
D. Baltimore Bank Riot of 1835
E. A Course of Legal Study (2d ed. 1836) and the Unrepentant
Aristocrat
III. Lost
A. Forgotten
B. Other Voices
C. Treatises on Ethics
IV. Found
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility and Crisis in the
American Legal Profession
B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
C. The Revival of David Hoffman
D. The Professionalism Crisis
V. Conclusion

I. INTRODUCTION
David Hoffman (1784-1854) founded the University of
Maryland Law School, authored A Course of Legal Study (1817),
the first methodical introduction to the study of American law,
successfully practiced law in Baltimore, and in 1836 wrote the first
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maxims of legal ethics, fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment. 1 Yet when a two-volume history of the Maryland
bench and bar was published in 1901, Hoffman was ignored. 2
After disappearing for over a century, American lawyers
and legal scholars rediscovered Hoffman. Since the late 1970s
Hoffman has been regularly and favorably cited as a guide to
overcoming ethical woes in the American legal profession. 3
How and why was David Hoffman “lost” to American law
for over a century, and why he was then “found”? Hoffman was
lost because his view of ethics was premised on virtue, specifically
the concept of honor, an ideal that was fading even as he wrote. A
gentleman was accorded honor by the public based on its
perception that his actions were right. Actions falling below the
standard of public morality were dishonorable. Thus, “What is
morally wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be
sanctioned by time or custom” (Resolution XXXIII). 4 Hoffman’s
aristocratic belief system was being displaced in an emerging age
1See David Hoffman, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore, Coale & Maxwell
1817); [Joseph Story,] A Course of Legal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students
of Law in the United States, 6 N. AM. REV. 45 (1817)(praising book); David
Hoffman, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744 (2 vols. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 2d ed.
1836)(listing Resolutions).
On David Hoffman, see Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a
Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, David
Hoffman’s Law School Lectures, 1822-1833, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127, 127 n.1
(1982)(listing biographical references to Hoffman); Francis S. Philbrick, Hoffman,
David, 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 111 (20 vols. Dumas Malone ed.
1932); Bill Sleeman, David Hoffman: A Biographical Sketch in DAVID HOFFMAN: LIFE,
LETTERS AND LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, 1821-1837, at 13-55 (Bill
Sleeman ed. 2011); Howard Schwerber, Hoffman, David, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF
AMER. LAW 267 (Roger K. Newman ed. 2009).
2Conway Whittle Sams & Elihu Samuel Riley, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MARYLAND:
A HISTORY, 1634-1901 (2 vols. 1901). Hoffman was also unmentioned in the
copious THE BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF MARYLAND
AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Baltimore, National Biographical Publishing Co.
1879), and is absent from the eight volume 1907-1909 series GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS.
When the ABA adopted its Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, it noted
Hoffman’s contribution but announced that its work was derived not from
Hoffman, but from the later work of Pennsylvania Judge George Sharswood. See
Transactions of the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33
A.B.A. REP. 3, 56 (1908).
3See Michael Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J.
343, 350-363 (2008).
4Hoffman, LEGAL STUDY, at 765.
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of individualism, in which public honor was supplanted by private
conscience. 5
In the 1830s Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “[I]n ages of
equality, every man finds his beliefs within himself, and … all his
feelings are turned in on himself.” 6 Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in
his journal in 1827, “It is the age of the first person singular.” 7 In
the age of individualism, private interests were primary. Whether a
lawyer behaved ethically became a test of private conscience, not
public honor. 8 This turn was accompanied by a second shift, in
which lawyers accepted that legal ethics differed from public
morality. The foremost duty of a lawyer was to serve his client’s
private interests, and the lawyer was not morally accountable to the
public for the client’s goals. As early as the 1840s, these shifts to
liberalism began leaving Hoffman behind. 9 Hoffman was so
forgotten that when his Resolutions were reprinted in 1953 the
legal historian Arthur Sutherland commented that it was “a
document which should be more widely known.” 10 Hoffman’s
5See

Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506-09 ((J. P. Mayer ed.
George Lawrence trans. 1969)(1966)(noting rise of “individualism,” coined by
Tocqueville, and discussing relation between individualism and democratic
society); Lawrence Frederick Kohl, THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM 6-13 (paper ed.
1989)(discussing rise of modern American, the “inner-directed individual”) .
6Tocqueville, at 506. See also id. at 508 (“Each man is forever thrown back on
himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude of his
own heart.”).
7 Daniel Walker Howe, MAKING THE AMERICAN SELF: JONATHAN EDWARDS TO
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 107 (paper ed. 2009 (1997)(quoting Emerson).
8See Timothy Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success: Being the Substance of
a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class, in the Cincinnati College, 1 W.
L.J. 542, 547 (1844)(urging lawyer should act so he is “justified at the bar of my
own conscience, whatever others may think of my conduct”); The Practice of the
Bar, 9 Monthly L. Rep. 241, 241 (1846)(asking “to be delivered from self-styled
conscientious lawyers, who will engage for no parties that are not morally right”).
9John T. Brooke, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ITS MORAL NATURE, AND PRACTICE
CONNECTION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 15 (Cincinnati, H. W. Derby & Co. 1849)(“The
question then is, can a conscientious man, in view of this law of love, bind
himself by an oath, to execute, as a judge, a system of law, which, although on the
whole , wise and good, will occasionally, incidentally and unavoidably, conflict with
the moral rights of individuals?”); George Sharswood, A COMPEND OF LECTURES
ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF LAW (Philadelphia, T. & J. W.
Johnson 1854).
10Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 151 (1954). He was
not the only legal historian to ignore Hoffman. In J. Willard Hurst, THE GROWTH
OF THE LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950), the first history of American law, Hurst
discusses legal ethics, but never mentions Hoffman. He mentions Sharswood.
Hoffman received prominent coverage in Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in
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legal ethics weren’t widely known because they were contrary to
the dominant ethic of lawyer behavior.
Hoffman was found in response to a crisis within the
American legal profession. By the late 1970s, many lawyers feared
that the liberal ideal of the lawyer as a zealous agent for a client 11
ignored the lawyer’s duties to society. This crisis was exacerbated
by two events: Watergate, in which lawyers blindly followed the
demands of their client, the President, 12 to society’s detriment, and
the ABA’s decision in 1978 to replace its 1969 Code of
Professional Responsibility, because the Code embraced the
“fiction” that ethical issues were “matters of ethics rather than
law.” 13
One criticism of the ABA’s 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was its emphasis that a lawyer’s ethical duty
was almost wholly to one’s client. 14 Some critics concluded the
Model Rules created an ethic of “winning at all costs,” and
encouraged “Rambo”-style litigation tactics, which many decried
by the late 1980s. 15
America from the Revolution to the Civil War ch. 2 (1965), but Miller ignored
Hoffman’s work on legal ethics.
11The liberal defense of the lawyer as agent of the client is explicated in Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relations, 85
Yale L.J. 1060 (1976) and Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1985 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613.
12See David R. Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A. J. 936, 937 (1975) (“[I]f
Watergate has not tarnished the image of lawyers, at least it has acutely
intensified public consciousness of questions of legal ethics and professional
accountability.”); Jethro K. Lieberman, CRISIS AT THE BAR 35 (1978)(“More than
twenty-five lawyers were formally named as defendants or co-conspirators in
Watergate and related criminal proceedings.”). See generally Kathleen Clark,
Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673 (2000).
13L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J.
639, 639 (1977).
14See Michael Ariens, “Playing Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 253-55 (2009)(detailing
history of expansion of protection of client confidences over interests of others).
15FIRST BLOOD starring Sylvester Stallone as John Rambo was released in 1982.
RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD II was released in 1985. The sequel made three times the
domestic revenue as the original. Its success led to lawyers calling “winning at all
costs” behavior Rambo litigation. See, e.g., Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why
Hardball Tactics Won’t Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 79; John J. Curtin Jr., Civil
Matters: A Message from the President, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 8 (discussing
Seventh Circuit report on Rambo litigation tactics and noting he had addressed
issue seven years earlier when chair of ABA Litigation Section); Judge Thomas
M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17
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An important reaction to this professionalism crisis was to
promote an ethic of lawyerly virtue. 16 Because Hoffman concluded
a lawyer’s duty to a client was limited by his duties to society, he
was used from the late 1970s on as an example of an historical
ethic contrary to the “standard conception” 17 of liberal neutrality in
representing clients.
Part II of this article discusses Hoffman’s Resolutions in
light of the antebellum history of Baltimore and Maryland and
Hoffman’s professional career and personal fortunes. Part III traces
the disappearance of Hoffman in legal ethics debates from the midnineteenth century through the first seven decades of the twentieth
century. Part IV provides a historical context for the revival of
Hoffman’s Resolutions, particularly the transformation of the
American legal profession beginning in the 1970s. Part V offers a
brief conclusion.
II. BALTIMORE AND THE HISTORY OF HOFFMAN’S
RESOLUTIONS
David Hoffman was born in 1784, the youngest of twelve
children. By then his father Peter, a German immigrant, had moved
the family from Frederick, Maryland to Baltimore and opened a
dry goods business. 18 His timing was excellent. The newly-formed
United States needed goods to supply its army. Baltimore was not
occupied by the British, and its merchants made substantial profits
PEPP. L. REV. 637 (1990)(decrying “unfair tactics and intimidation” and urging
effort to discourage “Rambo” attitude). The “hired gun” served as a metaphor
for zealous advocacy. See Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 16-30 (2d ed. 2009); David Luban, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 166 (1988)(”[T]he role of legal hired gun is
morally untenable.”)
16See THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban ed.
1983); Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29.
17See Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, at xx (concluding standard conception
allowed a lawyer to exhibit “extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client” and
who bore “no moral responsibility for the client’s goals or the means used to
attain them”). See generally Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 NYU L. Rev. 63 (1980) and David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 637 (suggesting lawyers
should be held morally responsible for the goals of their clients).
18BALTIMORE: PAST AND PRESENT WITH BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF ITS
REPRESENTATIVE MEN 295-96 (Baltimore, Richardson & Bennett 1871).
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during the War of Independence. 19 Peter Hoffman later opened
Peter Hoffman and Sons, a trading business with offices in
Baltimore and London. 20 Though its rise was recent, the Hoffman
family was one of leading merchant families of Baltimore. 21 The
Hoffmans were one of “a cluster of families [that] emerged ... as
the unchallenged leaders of Baltimore’s aristocracy.” 22 David
Hoffman was raised as a member of this social and economic elite,
which had replaced the traditional Maryland planter aristocracy.
When Hoffman became a member of the bar in the early
nineteenth century, he joined a relatively small but rapidly growing
(the number of lawyers in Baltimore increased from sixteen to
forty-three between 1799 and 1810) body. 23 Baltimore lawyers
came from its aristocracy, but this expansion in the number of
lawyers did not signify that “any corresponding democratization of
personnel or mores took place.” 24 Lawyers and merchants
constituted a “conservative republicanism,” 25 believing that elites
were to govern for the benefit of society. Baltimore lawyers were
almost always gentlemen, 26 due to the stringent Maryland statutory
limitations on becoming a lawyer. 27 The 1817-18 Baltimore
Directory listed David Hoffman among a group of just forty

A. Cassell, The Structure of Baltimore’s Politics in the Age of Jefferson, 17951812, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND 277, 278 (Aubrey C.
Land, Lois Green Carr, and Edward C. Papenfuse eds. 1977).
20BALTIMORE: PAST AND PRESENT, at 296.
21Gary Lawson Browne, BALTIMORE IN THE NATION, 1789-1861 at 12 (1980).
22Id. See also Whitman H. Ridgway, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP IN MARYLAND, 17901840, at 222 (1979)(noting Peter Hoffman’s influence in Baltimore).
23Browne, BALTIMORE IN THE NATION, at 59.
24Bloomfield, Republican Legal Culture, at 677.
25Charles G. Steffen, THE MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE: WORKERS AND POLITICS IN THE
AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1763-1812 at xii (1984).
26A few exceptions existed. See Wilbur Harvey Hunter, A BALTIMORE LAW FIRM: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF HINKLEY AND SINGLEY AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1817-1967, at 9
(1967)(noting arrival of Edward Hinkley in Baltimore “about 1815” and his
admission to the bar on March 25, 1817, just two years later).
27Ch. XLVIII, ' XII, 1 George I, Acts of April 1715, at 128, 132 (requiring
admission to the bar to practice law before the courts); Dennis R. Nolan, The
Effect of the Revolution on the Bar: The Maryland Experience, 62 Va. L. Rev. 969, 993
(1976)(“One other factor that may have helped keep the bar’s reputation intact
was Maryland’s continued insistence on three years of law study under the
supervision of a practicing attorney and an examination for fitness prior to
admission to the bar.”); 2 Anton-Hermann Chroust, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA 37 (2 vols. 1965). See Sams & Riley, at 245 (noting 1831
statutory changes to eligibility for admission to the bar).
19Frank
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attorneys. 28 Five years later, he was one of fifty-six. 29 This was a
small, elite group for the third largest city in the nation, numbering
over 62,000 people by 1820.
Hoffman’s Resolutions was published in the second edition
of A Course of Legal Study in 1836. They are in part a response to
the end of conservative republicanism in Maryland. As discussed
in section II.E., Hoffman’s published diatribes against Andrew
Jackson reflect his rearguard action to reclaim the place of the
gentleman aristocrat. Initial attacks on aristocratic rule in Maryland
helped precipitate the transformative 1812 Baltimore riot. 30 By the
early 1830s, Hoffman concluded his position at the University of
Maryland Law School was untenable. Soon thereafter, he suffered
great personal loss when his only son died. 31 In 1835, Baltimore
went through its wrenching Bank Riot, which confirmed
Hoffman’s dark view of the baleful consequences of Jacksonian
democracy. 32 Hoffman’s legal practice apparently also entered a
steep decline after 1830. These personal and professional
circumstances all influenced Hoffman’s Resolutions.
A. Baltimore, 1790-1812
Baltimore was a small provincial town when the United
States declared independence. In part because it was unoccupied
during the War of Independence, its merchants “made immense
profits fulfilling government contracts” for military provisions. 33
The first census in 1790 listed 13,503 persons in Baltimore City,
28THE BALTIMORE DIRECTORY, FOR 1817-18

passim & 91 (Baltimore, James Kennedy
printer 1817). Thanks to Brian Detweiler for compiling the list of attorneys from
the Directory.
29C. KEENAN’S BALTIMORE DIRECTORY, FOR 1822-23 (Baltimore, R. J. Matchett 1822).
30See Paul A. Gilje, The Baltimore Riots and the Breakdown of the Anglo-American Mob
Tradition, 13 J. SOC. HIST. 547 (1980) and Paul A. Gilje, RIOTING IN AMERICA 60-63
(1996)(both noting change in rioting); Paul A. Gilje, ‘Le Menu Peuple’ in America:
Identifying the Mob in the Baltimore Riots of 1812, 81 MD. HIST. MAG. 50 (1986);
Frank A. Cassell, The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812, 70 MD. HIST. MAG. 241 (1975);
Steffen, MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE, at 243-50.
31DAVID HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, at 13-55; see Philbrick, Hoffman, at
111.
32Robert E. Shalhope, THE BALTIMORE BANK RIOT: POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN
ANTEBELLUM MARYLAND (2009). See generally Michael Feldberg, THE TURBULENT
ERA: RIOT AND DISORDER IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1980) and Leonard L. Richards,
“GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING”: ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN
AMERICA (1970).
33Cassell, Structure of Baltimore’s Politics, at 278; Nolan, Effect, at 990.
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which doubled to 26,514 in 1800 and increased to 46,555 in
1810. 34 Baltimore embraced a variety of peoples creating a society
“new, raw, and constantly in flux.” 35 Divisions in society were
apparent early, and made more prominent by the rise of a twoparty system in Baltimore City by the end of the eighteenth
century, the ascendant Jeffersonian Republicans and the
aristocratic Federalists.
In 1796, the Maryland legislature granted corporate status
to Baltimore City, which gave to the City for the first time some
powers of self-governance. 36 Though this act would eventually
redound to the benefit of “mechanics,” skilled workingmen and
small manufacturers, the legal shift accorded Baltimore City was
not accompanied by a social shift. Instead, “society was the status
elite,” an exclusive group that controlled (at least initially) the
politics of the City. The status elite largely consisted of merchants
and lawyers. The composition of the political elite changed over
the first decade of the City’s corporate existence as the social
status of the representatives in the city council changed.
Jeffersonian Republicans eventually dominated the municipal
administration, and those Republicans were more often tradesmen
and mechanics than merchants or lawyers. Republican
representatives “used democratic rhetoric to gain support for their
own goals,” 37 which mercantile and professional elites found
anathema. But even as political representation changed, merchants,
lawyers and other professionals remained the occupational groups
with the largest wealth in Baltimore City during the first two
decades of the nineteenth century. They also continued to possess
significant social authority. 38
In mid-1807, a British warship attacked the frigate
Chesapeake off Norfolk, Virginia, impressed four sailors from the
Chesapeake, and hobbled the ship. About the same time Aaron
Burr was indicted in Virginia for treason by a grand jury, and news

34POPULATION OF MARYLAND: BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTIES, 1790-1949, at 29
(Maryland Planning Commission 1949).
35Cassell, Structure of Baltimore’s Politics, at 278.
36Browne, BALTIMORE IN THE NATION, at 34.
37Id. at 43. See generally Cassell, Structure of Baltimore’s Politics.
38Steffen, MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE, at 16 (Table 4, listing mean wealth in 1804
and 1815); see also Ridgway, COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP, at 71-95.
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of both events reached Baltimore on the same day. 39 In Republican
Baltimore City, the attack on the Chesapeake confirmed the
majority’s allegiance to President Jefferson and Republicans. In
the fall, lawyer Luther Martin returned to Baltimore, having
successfully defended Burr in his treason trial. 40 Part of Martin’s
defense of Burr included steady invective against Thomas
Jefferson, who Martin earlier accused of acting like the hated King
George III. 41 Upon his return, Martin immediately renewed his
attack on Jefferson. He also defended the conduct of Chief Justice
(and Federalist) John Marshall in a notice in the Federalist press.
Martin declared, “We have proved that in America there are
lawyers who cannot be intimidated by fear of presidential
vengeance, nor by the phrenzy of a deceived, misguided people.
From securing even to those destined to be the victims of power,
those rights for the enjoyment of which the constitution is and
ought to be their sacred honor and inviolate pledge.” 42 Martin’s
statements were accurately perceived by Baltimore Republicans as
directly attacking Jefferson. The result was a riot, similar to a 1794
Baltimore riot.
Disputes between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans
in Baltimore City intensified. By 1808, journeymen mechanics,
often propertyless, became more militant. Federalists were aghast
at the tarring and feathering of an Anglophile shop foreman named
Robert Beatty by several members of a shoemakers’ society, and
the next year members of the Union Society of Journeymen
Cordwainers were indicted for conspiracy. 43 Republicans criticized
the violence, but generally sympathized with the shoemakers. 44 An
essay by “A Journeyman Cordwainer” analogized the action
Structure of Baltimore’s Politics. Two years earlier, Martin had
successfully represented Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, a Federalist, in
his Senate impeachment trial. See William H. Rehnquist, GRAND INQUESTS: THE
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW
JACKSON 23 (1992).
On Martin, see Edward S. Delaplaine, Martin, Luther, 12 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY at 343; Gregory A. Stiverson, Martin, Luther, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF
AMER. LAW at 364 . See generally Bill Kauffman, FORGOTTEN FOUNDER, DRUNKEN
PROPHET: THE LIFE OF LUTHER MARTIN (2008).
40See generally R. Kent Newmyer, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR (2012); Peter
Charles Hoffer, THE TREASON TRIALS OF AARON BURR (2008).
41Newmyer, TREASON TRIAL, at 149.
42Steffen, MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE, at 232 (quoting Martin).
43Id. at 209.
44Id. at 220.
39Cassell,
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against Beatty with the tarring and feathering of Tories during the
Revolution. He argued that on occasion “the people could not
permit justice to be stymied in the courts; they had to take matters
into their own hands.” A Journeyman Cordwainer concluded: “‘I
am serious. I think the discretionary law of tarring, &c. is a happy
general supplement to particular law, providing for heinous
offences which would otherwise escape punishment.’” 45 Though
the defendants were found guilty of assault in January 1809, the
governor pardoned them after three days in jail. Beatty was then
tried for perjury but acquitted. 46
In June 1809, the Union cordwainers struck two
shoemakers, James Sloan and Angello Atkinson, who employed
journeymen who did not belong to the Union. Sloan was a well
known Federalist, and Republicans continued to support the
strikers. One of the non-Union journeymen, John Davidson,
claimed a criminal conspiracy by the Union to prevent him from
obtaining a job, and the Baltimore County Criminal Court issued
thirty-seven indictments against Union members. 47 The Union
hired Luther Martin to represent them, and though only one
journeyman was tried, the conviction of Union President George
Powly apparently led to its demise. 48
B. The Baltimore Riots of 1812
In 1808, Alexander Contee Hanson Jr. founded the Federal
Republican, “an extreme Federalist journal on almost every
count.” 49 Hanson was a member of Baltimore and Maryland’s
aristocratic elite, and the Federal Republican delighted in
skewering Republicans and their supporters, often designated
“THE RABBLE,” and attacked radical “democracy.” 50 The
Federal Republican was also committed to promoting British
interests. Hoffman and Hanson were strong political allies and
likely friends. They apparently attended St. John’s College in
45Id. On the various labor conspiracy cases in the early federal period, see
Christopher L. Tomlins, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 128-79 (1993).
46Steffen, MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE, at 221.
47Id. at 222.
48Steffen, MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE, at 223.
49Jeffrey L. Pasley, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 241 (2001).
50Id.
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Annapolis at the same time, both were Federalists, both were
lawyers and both were from aristocratic families. And both
believed in governance by the elite, not the masses. 51
On June 18, 1812, President James Madison declared war
against Great Britain. Republican Baltimore strongly supported
war, but Hanson raged against it: “We are avowedly hostile to the
administration of James Madison, and we never will breathe under
the dominion, direct or derivative, of Bonaparte, let it be
acknowledged when it may.” 52 On June 22, between thirty and
forty men demolished the paper’s printing office, and Hanson
escaped to the District of Columbia, where he again began
printing. 53 At this point, the riot was channeled within its
traditional limits, for the mob focused on the destruction of
property rather than people. 54
Instead of disbanding, the mob gathered most nights for a
month in search of various targets, property selected by factions of
the mob. Then, on July 26, Hanson and other Federalists returned
to Baltimore, and the next day they distributed an edition of the
Federal Republican that appeared to be printed on Charles Street
in Baltimore. (It was actually published in Georgetown.) Hanson
and his supporters then barricaded themselves in the Charles Street
building, and waited to see if the mob would respond. It did. 55
By daybreak on July 28, Thaddeus Gale and John Williams
had been shot to death by defenders of the Federal Republican,
and Hanson and his supporters had agreed to surrender. Some of
Hanson’s supporters successfully fled the Charles Street building,
but others were captured by the mob and beaten. Some members of
the mob demanded death for “every ‘monarchist’ and ‘aristocrat’ it
could lay its hands on.” 56 Twenty-seven year old David Hoffman
was one of those escapees whom the mob caught and nearly
hanged. 57 Hanson and about two dozen others were taken to jail.
Republican Legal Culture, at 676.
TYRANNY OF PRINTERS, at 246.
53Cassell, Great Baltimore Riot, at 244-45; Gilje, Baltimore Riots of 1812, at 548-49.
54Id. at 549-50.
55Id. at 552; Cassell, Great Baltimore Riot, at 247.
56Robert J. Brugger, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT, 1634-1980, at 178 (1988).
57John Neal, WANDERING RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOMEWHAT BUSY LIFE 206 (Boston,
Roberts Bros. 1869)(noting the riot “where Professor Hoffman would have been
strung up, without judge or jury, on a tree-branch, yet overhanging Jones’s Falls,
51Bloomfield,
52Pasley,
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That night, the mob entered the jail and beat to death James
Maccuban Lingan, a general in the Revolutionary War. Members
of the mob also severely beat Light Horse Harry Lee, another,
more famous Revolutionary War general (and the father of Robert
E. Lee), as well as other Federalists, including Hanson. 58
After the riots were finally quelled in early August, the
recriminations began. Federalists used Lingan’s death to win a
majority in the Maryland House of Delegates, 59 and the lessons of
the riots for Federalists were that all extralegal violence must be
rejected and that only force was sufficient to halt mob violence.
The first lesson was a lesson about the primacy of law over
custom. When the mob began demolishing the Federal
Republican’s initial printing house in June, the Republican mayor,
Edward Johnson, urged the mob to stop. In reply, one man said,
echoing A Journeyman Cordwainer, “Mr. Johnson, I know you
very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the laws of the land must
sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail.” 60 This echo of
earlier statements reflected a view abhorrent to Federalists. The
mob deferred neither to the elite, nor to a common idea of law, but
asserted an authority to govern and to govern beyond the common
law. 61 The title of a report of the Committee of Grievances and
Courts of Justice of the Maryland House of Delegates condemning
the riot captured the view of aristocratic republican elites: A
Portrait of the Evils of Democracy, Submitted to the Consideration
of the People of Maryland. 62
C. Hoffman and Professional Deportment, 1810-1837
but for the providential interference of a stranger, who satisfied the murderers
that they had got hold of the wrong man.”). See also Brugger, MIDDLE
TEMPERAMENT, at 178 (noting Hoffman and others joined Hanson, and many,
including Hoffman, barely escaped death).
58Gilje, Baltimore Riots of 1812, at 555; Cassell, Great Baltimore Riot, at 256. The riot
was noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America as an “example
of the excesses to which despotism of the majority may lead.” See Tocqueville,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at 252 n.4 .
59Gilje, Baltimore Riots of 1812, at 556; Cassell, Great Baltimore Riot, at 259.
60Gilje, Baltimore Riots of 1812, at 549.
61This is suggested indirectly in Daniel J. Hulsebosch, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW
YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD,
1664-1830, at 229 (2005)(noting Federalists hoped the Constitution would “create
neither a government of men nor one of law but rather one of men governed by a
common understanding of law”).
62A PORTRAIT OF THE EVILS OF DEMOCRACY, SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF
THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND (Baltimore, n.p. 1816).
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When A Course of Legal Study was published in 1817,
Hoffman had been married for over a year, and his wife, Mary
McKean, from a prominent Philadelphia family, had given birth to
their first child, a son. In a letter from the mid-1820s, Hoffman
claimed that he earned $9,000 per year from 1818 through 1823,
which if true made him one of Baltimore’s wealthiest lawyers. 63
Though he had not yet lectured there, in 1814 Hoffman was
appointed Professor of Law at the new University of Maryland. 64 A
Course of Legal Study was immediately and lavishly praised for its
learnedness, most importantly in the North American Review in an
unsigned review by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. 65
Hoffman’s only reference to professional deportment in the
first edition of A Course of Legal Study came in the last “Auxiliary
Subject.” This Auxiliary Subject began with a short introduction
from Hoffman, which spoke in optimistic terms concerning the
legal profession. 66 A lawyer undertook proper conduct when he
acquired “liberal knowledge,” for such knowledge was equated
with “honourable views.” 67
Four years later, Hoffman published his Syllabus of a
Course of Lectures. The last lecture (the 301st) was intended to be
devoted to the topic of professional deportment. 68 Although
several lectures included some detail, this lecture included just its
title. In late 1822, Hoffman began his course of lectures at the
University of Maryland. His introductory lecture to his course of
legal study was published a year later, 69 and two additional
lectures and an address to law students were published between
1824 and 1826. 70 Between 1822 and 1832 he also represented
63Bloomfield,
64Id.

Republican Legal Culture, at 678.

65[Story,] A Course of Legal Study. One anonymous review published in the
Baltimore-based Portico was highly critical. 3 THE PORTICO 192 (1817).
66Hoffman, LEGAL STUDY, at 324-34.
67Id. at 327.
68David Hoffman, SYLLABUS OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON LAW, reprinted in DAVID
HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES 61, 156.
69David Hoffman, A LECTURE, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE OF LECTURES, NOW
DELIVERING IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, reprinted in id. at 157.
70David Hoffman, A LECTURE BEING THE SECOND OF A SERIES OF LECTURES,
INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE OF LECTURES NOW DELIVERING IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND, reprinted in id. at 249; David Hoffman, A LECTURE BEING THE THIRD OF
A SERIES OF LECTURES, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE OF LECTURES NOW DELIVERING IN
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clients in five separate cases in the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as other clients in the Maryland Court of Appeals. 71
This decade represented Hoffman’s peak as a lawyer and legal
educator.
Beginning in 1833, personal and professional events
buffeted Hoffman. His only son died that year. Although he
remained listed as an attorney in the Baltimore Directory, his last
recorded appearance before any appellate court was in 1832. 72 He
gave his last University of Maryland law lecture in 1833, and then
became engaged in a long and serious legal and financial dispute
with the University. More generally, the status of and honor
bestowed on lawyers was regularly questioned.
One remarkable example of the venom directed at lawyers
at this time was A Letter to the Hon. Rufus Choate, written in June,
1831, and published as a pamphlet in 1832. 73 Choate, a brilliant
Massachusetts lawyer and Whig, 74 was attacked by Democrat and
labor leader Frederick Robinson for using the cabal of the
“brotherhood of the bar” to prevent Robinson from representing
another in court. Robinson made a long and artful argument in
favor of opening the bar to all, for limiting its membership was
“anti-republican,” emblematic of associations whose object is “to
settle down society into casts [sic], and render the barriers between
reprinted in id. at 299; David Hoffman, AN ADDRESS
reprinted in id. at 249.
71DAVID HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS AND LECTURES, at 53.
72Id. at 26, 29. Hoffman was listed in the MATCHETT=S BALTIMORE DIRECTOR for
1833, 1835, and 1837. See MATCHETT’S BALTIMORE DIRECTOR 92 (Baltimore, 1833);
MATCHETT’S BALTIMORE DIRECTOR 123 (Baltimore 1835); MATCHETT’S BALTIMORE
DIRECTOR 168 (Baltimore, 1837). His name was listed in the 1842 MATCHETT’S
BALTIMORE DIRECTOR, see id. at 207, and he is listed as a counsellor in another
directory. See CRAIG’S BUSINESS DIRECTORY AND BALTIMORE ALMANAC 105
(Baltimore, J. Robinson 1842). He is not listed in the BALTIMORE DIRECTORY FOR
1845 (Baltimore, John Murphy 1845), when he was living in Philadelphia.
73Frederick Robinson, A LETTER TO THE HON. RUFUS CHOATE, CONTAINING A BRIEF
EXPOSURE OF LAW CRAFT, AND SOME OF THE ENCROACHMENTS OF THE BAR UPON THE
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE (1832).
74See Claude M. Fuess, Choate, Rufus, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 86
(Dumas Malone ed. 20 vols. 1932); Jean V. Matthews, Choate, Rufus, in YALE BIOG.
DICT. OF AMER. LAW at 105; Joseph Hodges Choate, Rufus Choate, in 3 GREAT
AMERICAN LAWYERS 531 (William Draper Lewis ed. 8 vols. 1907); Daniel Walker
Howe, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS 225-35 (paperback ed.
1979); Claude M. Fuess, RUFUS CHOATE: THE WIZARD OF THE LAW (1928); Jean V.
Matthews, RUFUS CHOATE: THE LAW AND CIVIC VIRTUE (1980).
THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND,

TO STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,
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them impassable; to form society into aristocratic, subordinate
gradations, and ‘order,’ and to fix insuperable boundaries between
them. But the basis of our community is equality, and not
subordination.” 75 The bar was a part of a powerful aristocracy that
“saps the liberties of the people,” and whose members “exalt
themselves and [] degrade and debase the rest of our species,” to
“distinguish themselves, from what they call ‘the common herd,
the mob, the vulgar, the rabble, &c.’” 76 Robinson took a similar
tone in an 1834 oration to trade union members, in which he
attacked the monopoly of the bar, and claimed “the judiciary in this
State [Massachusetts], and in every State where judges hold their
office during life, is the headquarters of the aristocracy.” 77
Robinson’s excoriation of Choate and the legal profession was a
paradigmatic example of Jacksonian democracy, of the rejection of
rule by an aristocratic elite in favor of a body based on “equality,
and not subordination.” It served also as an example of everything
David Hoffman opposed.
Law addresses across the nation also changed.
Pennsylvania lawyer Job Tyson spoke to the Law Academy of the
Philadelphia bar in 1839, opening with, “It is natural to feel a deep
solicitude for the repute of a profession, which we have chosen as
the business of our lives.” 78 He began this way because it was true
that “[m]any bad men, wearing the panoply of the profession, have
been enabled to perpetrate their deeds under its sanction.” 79 It was
crucial that lawyers, “at the darkest period of our political history,
when tyranny wore the guise of a necessary tax for the public

A Letter, at 15.
at 16 and n.*.
77Frederick Robinson, A Program for Labor, reprinted in SOCIAL THEORIES OF
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATIVE WRITINGS OF THE PERIOD 1825-1850, at
320, 328 (Joseph L. Blau ed. 1947)(reprinting in part An Oration delivered before the
Trades’ Union of Boston and Vicinity, July 4, 1834 (Boston, 1834)). See also Tomlins,
at 191-92 (noting speech and response by Peter Oxenbridge Thacher) and Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., THE AGE OF JACKSON 167-68 (1948)(same). A brief biography of
Robinson is found in SOCIAL THEORIES, at 374.
78Job Tyson, THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL CHARACTER 5 (Philadelphia, John C.
Clark 1839).
79Id. at 6. See also John M. Scott, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE LAW ACADEMY OF
PHILADELPHIA, AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION, IN SEPTEMBER 1830, at 7
(Philadelphia, Mifflin & Parry 1830)(“Our profession has suffered deeply from
the unworthiness of individuals who have worn its garb without adopting its
principles.”). See also Maxwell Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics: The Self-Image of the
American Bar (1830-1860), 12 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 306 (1968).
75Robinson,
76Id.

LOST AND FOUND

18

good,” cultivate an “elevated honour.” 80 In 1831 Massachusetts
lawyer Emory Washburn spoke to the Worcester Lyceum. He
rejected the Jacksonian claim that “rights and privileges are
unequally distributed and enjoyed.” 81 Massachusetts lawyer (and
later judge) Peter Oxenbridge Thacher defended the law on the
ground that it “constitutes the ligament of society,” binding all
classes, from merchant and mechanic to lawyer and farmer, and
worked as “that great leveller of human arrogance, and equalizer of
social right and duty.” 82 Leveling did not interest Hoffman.
Democratization of the legal profession worked together
with political democratization. In 1831, the Maryland legislature
reduced the required time of legal apprenticeships to two years. 83
The aristocratic argument against relaxing bar admission standards
was made by Washburn, who concluded states had a choice
between “an enlightened, educated, independent body of men, or a
host of self-constituted, noisy and narrow-minded pettifoggers.” 84
One goal of Hoffman’s was to protect the elevated status of the
lawyer in society. But this proved difficult. Writing in 1846,
Hoffman declared his “deep conviction that the high tone of the
Bar has suffered some impairment.” 85 His conviction existed in
1837, when Hoffman’s Miscellaneous Thoughts on Men, Manners,
and Things was published:
The phobia causidicorum [fear of lawyers], so
prevalent among the lower orders in this and other
80Tyson, INTEGRITY

at 9, 29.
Washburn, A LECTURE, READ BEFORE THE WORCESTER LYCEUM, MARCH
30TH, 1831, at 3 (Worcester, Dorr & Howland 1831). On Washburn, see Robert M.
Spector, Emory Washburn: Conservator of the New England Legal Heritage, 22 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1978); Robert M. Spector, Washburn, Emory, in YALE BIOG. DICT.
OF AMER. LAW at 574.
82Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, AN ADDRESS, PRONOUNCED ON THE FIRST TUESDAY OF
MARCH, 1831, at 17 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little and Wilkins 1831). In late 1834,
Thacher, then a judge, responded to Robinson’s July 4 speech by instructing the
grand jury that “[e]mployers may not combine against their workmen to depress,
by unfair means, their wages; nor may workmen combine against employers,
unjustly, to raise them. This is even handed justice, and is as good for the laborer
as for the employer.” Tomlins, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY, at 193.
83 Ch. 268, § 2, Laws of Maryland—1831, at 1032.
84Emory Washburn, On the Legal Profession in New England, 19 AM. JURIST & L.
MAG. 49, 52 (1838). Although “pettifogger” had been used for decades in the
United States, Hoffman never used it in any writing.
85David Hoffman, HINTS ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS 3
(Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co. 1846).
81Emory
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countries, seems to me to be often more in words
than in substance; for though lawyers are the
constant subjects of the popular jeers, of the railing
of the multitude, and of the ridicule even of the
drama; and though the people have habitually
leagued them with the devil, and love to tell many
disparaging tales of them, yet lawyers still remain
the most entrusted, the most honoured, and withal,
the most efficient proportion to their number of any
in the community; and, if there be still remaining
among us any elements that can be called
aristocratic, they will be found no where so
certainly, as among gentlemen of the legal
profession. 86
D. Baltimore Bank Riot of 1835
Two other outside events may have influenced the more
pessimistic tone of the second edition of Hoffman=s A Course of
Legal Study. First, the re-election of Andrew Jackson in 1832 was
anathema to Hoffman. Jackson revived the party system and
emphasized ideological differences among the people, which
Hoffman and other Whigs believed divided society against itself.
By the 1836 presidential election, the idea of party itself “became a
partisan issue.” 87 Second, Baltimore, known as “mobtown” since
the 1812 riots, exploded in riots in August 1835. 88 The Baltimore
Bank Riot was just one of many riots in the United States that year.
Niles’ Weekly Register, a national newspaper printed in Baltimore,
listed fifty-three riots in the United States in 1835 alone. 89 The
86Anthony

Grumbler [David Hoffman], MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS ON MEN,
MANNERS, AND THINGS 323-24 (2d ed. Baltimore, Plaskitt & Gugle 1841)(1837).
This is also found in Hoffman, HINTS , at 60-61.
87Daniel Walker Howe, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 485 (2007). Another annoyance may have been the
decision of the Democratic Party to meet in Baltimore in 1835 for its national
convention. Id. Hoffman’s concern may have been ameliorated by the election of
James Thomas, an anti-Jacksonian, as governor of Maryland. Brugger, MIDDLE
TEMPERAMENT, at 806 (chronology of Maryland). See also MISCELLANEOUS
THOUGHTS, at 194 (attacking the “miserable logic, and worse morals, of very
many partisans”).
88Gilje, Baltimore Riots, at 556.
89See Richards, “GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING”, at 12 (listing number of
riots in United States from 1830-1838 as compiled in Niles’ Register, which did not
include all riots); see also Ashraf H. A. Rushdy, AMERICAN LYNCHING 32
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Baltimore riot, caused in major part due to the collapse of the Bank
of Maryland, reflected continuing deep class and social differences
in Baltimore City.
After Andrew Jackson vetoed the re-charter of the Second
Bank of the United States in 1832, 90 he began to destroy the
“Monster” by depositing all federal funds in selected state banks
(which his adversaries called “pet” banks), and withdrawing funds
from the Second Bank as needed for pay federal expenses. Both
actions were intended to bleed the Second Bank dry, and Jackson
succeeded. 91 The pet banks were usually “friendly” to Democratic
views, and one such bank was the Baltimore-based Union Bank,
operated by the upright Thomas Ellicott.
In 1831, Evan Poultney purchased a controlling interest in
the Bank of Maryland. He appointed two young Baltimore
lawyers, John Glenn and Reverdy Johnson, the latter of whom was
well-known and well-connected, as members of the board of
directors. The directors needed to attract capital to the Bank of
Maryland, and so offered to pay a munificent five percent on all
deposits, which encouraged ordinary Baltimoreans to place their
savings there. These three men, with two others, formed a secret
“Club” to enrich themselves through the Bank. In spring 1833,
these three correctly predicted that secretary of the treasury Roger
Brooke Taney, a Maryland lawyer, would name the Union Bank
one of the government’s “pet” banks. They resolved to purchase,
through the illicit beneficence of the Bank of Maryland, as much
stock in the Union Bank as possible. A year later, the Bank of
Maryland closed, but not before Johnson engaged in several frauds
designed to hide his involvement in its dissolution. The closing of
the Bank of Maryland was followed by pamphlets from the
principals accusing each other of duplicity and fraud. By early
August 1835, the people of Baltimore, many of whom had lost
their savings and were now at the mercy of the equity chancellor in
charge of the matter, were anxious and angry. And they looked to
take out their anger on someone. 92
(2012)(“The year 1835 saw at least 147 riots, 109 of which occurred in the
summer.”).
90Robert V. Remini, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 80-84 (paperback ed.
1967).
91Id. at 125.
92The material in this paragraph is taken from Shalhope, BANK RIOT, at 32-44.
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Samuel Harker operated the Baltimore Republican
newspaper, the only one of the five Baltimore papers to support
Andrew Jackson’s Democratic Republicans. 93 Harker was a
determined Jacksonian, and “pitted the bank and the ‘aristocracy’
against Andrew Jackson and ‘the people.’” 94 Jacksonians
uniformly opposed aristocracy in favor of “the people.” Banks,
through their control of money, were a likely source of aristocratic
rule. 95
Like A Journeyman Cordwainer and others before him,
Harker also approved of the people’s authority to take the law into
their hands when the law failed to meet the people’s needs. Thus, if
the law was impotent, it would “sometimes be proper for the
populace to punish certain offences which can be reached by no
other means.” 96 The ultimate power of the people was found in
Judge Lynch, or lynching, the authority of the people to take the
law into their own hands when necessary. 97 “Lynching” was first
widely used in the aftermath of the Vicksburg, Mississippi,
hangings of gamblers on July 6, 1835. 98 Anti-Jacksonians viewed
many of Andrew Jackson’s actions as lawless, 99 and some “saw
Jackson as a kind of Judge Lynch, the inventor, in his way, of
lynching.” 100

93Id.

at 21.
at 23. See also id. at 24 (quoting Harker that “an organized aristocracy is
leagued in concert against the rights of the poor, and the liberties of the country.”).
On the origins of the sovereignty of “the people,” see the brilliant book by
Edmund S. Morgan, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (paperback ed. 1989).
95See, e.g., Shalhope, BALTIMORE BANK RIOT, at 29 (quoting Harker that aristocrats
planned “to rule the country by means of their money” and, should they
succeed, “to destroy the freedom of thought, the liberty of speech, and the rights
of action, which the constitution of our country has guaranteed to the poor man
as well as the man of wealth.”).
96Id. at 31 (quoting Harker, Baltimore American, August 5, 1835).
97Id. See also Christopher Waldrep, THE MANY FACES OF JUDGE LYNCH: EXTRALEGAL
VIOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27-38 (2002); Rushdy, AMERICAN
LYNCHING, at 28-38.
98Waldrep, MANY FACES, at 37; Rushdy, AMERICAN LYNCHING, at 32. See The
Vicksburg Tragedy, Niles’ Register, Aug. 1, 1835, at 391-92 (reprinting article on
lynching).
99Howe, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT, at 411 (Jackson “did not manifest a general
respect for the authority of the law when it got in the way of the policies he chose
to pursue.”).
100Waldrep, MANY FACES, at 36.
94Id.

LOST AND FOUND

22

On Wednesday, August 5, 1835, several hundred persons
milled about with the apparent common view that the lawyers John
Glenn and Reverdy Johnson “had mismanaged the trust and abused
the confidence reposed in them.” 101 Though several boys threw
stones at Johnson’s house, others stopped them in the hope that the
equity chancellor would assist those who had lost their savings
when the Bank of Maryland closed. The next night Johnson’s
house received more damage, and the Mayor attempted to halt
destruction of property by urging the crowd to follow the rule of
law. 102 On Saturday night the riot began. Although the attack on
Johnson’s house failed, rioters successfully destroyed John Glenn’s
home after carrying off his wine collection. 103 On Sunday, the
rioters finally entered Johnson’s home, and finding that some
furniture had been removed, obliterated his library, including “rare
books of the law.” 104 They then burned the house. The riot finally
petered out on Tuesday, August 11.
At least five died and twenty others were seriously
wounded. 105 The criminal trials of those charged with participating
in the riot were fairly tried; some were convicted, and others
acquitted. Reverdy Johnson continued his efforts to conceal his
involvement in the fraud, filing civil suits against Evan Poultney
and others, and having a protégé, assistant attorney general
Richard Gill, obtain indictments against several persons on whom
Johnson wished to place blame for the collapse of the Bank of
Maryland. 106 Johnson’s actions were occasionally successful as a
legal matter, but unconvincing as a public matter.
E. A Course of Legal Study (2d ed. 1836) and the Unrepentant
Aristocrat

BALTIMORE BANK RIOT, at 46 (quoting “a gentleman” present). See
also Narrative of Events, Niles’ Register, Aug. 15, 1835, at 412-16 (detailing
Baltimore riot).
102Shalhope, BALTIMORE BANK RIOT, at 46-49.
103Id. at 56-57.
104Id. at 60.
105Id. at 1.
106See generally id. at 70-105. Johnson’s biographer exonerates him from any
responsibility, a conclusion Shalhope conclusively disproves. See Bernard C.
Steiner, LIFE OF REVERDY JOHNSON 12 (1914)(“Johnson was conclusively cleared
from any wrong-doing in connection with the bank.”). On Johnson, see Bernard
Christian Steiner, Reverdy Johnson, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 407; William L.
Barney, Johnson, Reverdy, in YALE BIOG DICT. OF AMER. LAW at 300.
101Shalhope,
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One of the criticisms of Hoffman’s 1817 A Course of Legal
Study was its length. 107 The second edition was more than double
the size of the first, comprising 876 pages in two volumes. One of
the additions made by Hoffman was to his discussion of
professional deportment. Instead of listing eleven disparate
readings to acquaint the reader with professional deportment,
Hoffman provided a syllabus of twenty-one readings, including
four from the Bible, followed by an essay and fifty Resolutions in
Regard to Professional Deportment. 108
By the time the second edition went to press, all of the
criminal trials concerning the 1835 riot had been completed, as
well as many of the “bank trials” in which Johnson worked
assiduously to demonstrate he was a wronged man. Hoffman left
no record of his thoughts of either the riot or the collapse of the
Bank of Maryland. As a general matter, the riot would have
confirmed his view of the dangers of Jacksonian democracy, and
Johnson’s actions would have struck Hoffman as dishonorable and
venal.
The purpose of Hoffman’s exposition on professional
deportment is found in his introductory essay. Even though the
science of the law “furnishes the heart with the purest principles of
action,” the “practice of our profession is peculiarly calculated to
suppress their influence.” 109 The depravity of man often tempted
lawyers to seek fame, money, or power. This temptation was
joined by the fact that “disputes and controversies” in which
lawyers were necessarily involved “are frequently founded on bad,
if not the worst of passions.” 110 Thus, young lawyers needed to be
on guard to avoid professional calamity through seduction by
passion. The lawyer avoided this fate through “careful study of the
moral sciences,” and just as importantly, by understanding that law
could instill “the principles of an elevated honour.” 111 Honor
demonstrated one’s virtue, which was the antidote to the
temptation of the passions. Further, a young lawyer’s departure
from “the most honourable and refined moral deportment” “excites
more than ordinary distrust,” for the lawyer’s trustworthiness is
1073

THE PORTICO 192, 199 (1817).
2 LEGAL STUDY, at 720-75 (2d ed. 1836).
109Id. at 745.
110Id.
111Id. at 747.
108Hoffman,
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essential to his success. 112 Hoffman uses the words “honour,”
“honourable” or “honourably” thirteen times in his seven-and-onehalf page essay on professional deportment.
Although honor consisted both of “genteel” and “primal”
pathways, 113 it was comprised of three aspects: first, a belief in
one’s worthiness; second, publishing to the public one’s claim of
self-worth; and third, “assessment of that claim by the public, a
judgment based upon the behavior of the claimant.” 114
Hoffman’s emphasis on honor reflected his understanding
of the world, a world disappearing in Baltimore and most of
Jacksonian America. 115 A gentleman acted not to receive the praise
of others, or as a matter of pride, but in order to demonstrate his
understanding of his elevated role in society. He acted honorably
to demonstrate his virtuous reputation. Writing at this time,
Tocqueville noted, “Honor, in times of the zenith of its power
directs men’s wills more than their beliefs.” 116 Gordon S. Wood,
discussing the late eighteenth century American gentleman, wrote,
“Honor was exclusive, heroic, and aristocratic, and presumed a
hierarchical world,” a world then dissolving. 117
In 1837, Hoffman tried his hand at literature, publishing
Miscellaneous Thoughts on Men, Manners and Things, using the
not-well-hidden pseudonym Anthony Grumbler. Hoffman rejected
the Jacksonian “Numerical Principle of Government” (“equality”)
as “jacobinical,” a “suicidal” act. He contrasted the “two great and
distinct classes of people”: “the one selfish, crude, and mainly
unprincipled, the other patriotic, enlightened, and mainly
112Id.

113Bertram

Wyatt-Brown, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS & BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD
SOUTH xvi-xvii (paper 25th anniversary ed. 2007)(1982).
114Id. at 14. This “public” assessment was not made by all the people, but by an
“honor group,” a “society of equals who have the power to judge our behavior.”
James Bowman, HONOR: A HISTORY 4 (paper ed. 2006).
115See George Wilson Pierson, TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA 494-96 (paper ed.
1996)(1938)(discussing late 1831 conversation between Tocqueville and Baltimore
lawyer John Latrobe noting aristocratic “spirit” of Baltimore and Maryland and
its displacement by democratic views).
116Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, at 616.
117Gordon S. Wood, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 17891815, at 159 (2009). See also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor, in A COMPANION TO
AMERICAN THOUGHT 310 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds.
(1995))(discussing importance of concept in American history).
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virtuous.” The former group was “the earthy, or democratic party.”
The latter was “the intellectual or aristocratic party.” 118 For
Hoffman, aristocrat is a term of honor, and aristocracy is favorably
contrasted with the “ultraism of democracy.” 119 Hoffman was
raised in a place in which different classes of people naturally
undertook different roles in society. While some opposed these
hierarchies, they were common to Baltimore and Maryland in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and indeed class
conflict was one of the reasons for the riot of 1812. Class-based
grievances and resentment also helped trigger the 1835 bank riot.
Hoffman’s emphasis on honor allowed him to perceive
conflicts of interest between lawyer and client with a keen eye. For
example, Hoffman explained clearly why a lawyer should not be
permitted to purchase an interest in a client’s cause. 120 Hoffman
initially distinguished between contingent fee arrangements, to
which he did not object, and the purchasing of causes, which
interfered with the “absolute purity” of the lawyer-client
relationship. 121 A contingent fee contract was an “independent
contract,” in which the lawyer exerted no “influence” on the client,
and when the client was poor, to ban such arrangements was to
make the client unable to prosecute his claim or to defend against
another’s claim. On the other hand, the purchase of the client’s
cause ordinarily occurred after the lawyer and client had
established a relationship, and “after the strength of his case has
become known to me.” 122
With regard to other aspects of the fee, a lawyer was to
charge only a fee for “what my judgment and conscience inform
118MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS,

at 233-34. For the contrary view, see William
Leggett, The Division of Parties, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 4, 1834, reprinted in
SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 66, 67 (“The one party is for a
popular government; the other for an aristocracy. The one party is composed, in
a great measure, of the farmers, mechanics, laborers, and other producers of the
middling and lower classes, according to the common gradation by the scale of
wealth, and the other of the consumers, the rich, the proud, the privileged, of
those who, if our Government were converted into an aristocracy, would become
our dukes, lords, marquises, and baronets.”).
119MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS, at 36. Tocqueville concluded that “hidden at the
bottom of a lawyer’s soul one finds some of the tastes and habits of an
aristocracy.” Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, at 264.
120Hoffman, A COURSE, at 760-62 (Resolution XXIV).
121Id. at 760.
122Id. at 762.
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me is my due” (Resolution XXVII). Additionally, an honorable
lawyer refused to succumb to the baser aspects of the marketplace.
A lawyer should avoid “half fees,” a discounted amount based on
the dishonorable action of “underbidding of my professional
brethren.” 123 Hoffman warned lawyers against commingling their
money with client funds (XXVI), stressed the duty to return client
funds promptly (XXV), urged lawyers to refuse to act as a witness
when also serving as counsel (XXXV) or to switch sides (VIII),
and reminded lawyers that they needed to preserve and return all
papers to the client (XXX). Additionally, the lawyer acted
respectfully and courteously at all times toward the judge, officers
of the court and opposing counsel, no matter the other’s “character
and deportment” (Resolutions III, IV, V and VI).
The idea of honor played a prominent in several other
resolutions. When a client’s reputation was at stake, no
compromise was possible, and the matter necessarily had to go to a
verdict. Hoffman made clear that this should occur even when the
opposing party possessed an “elevated standing,” for the “great and
wealthy” were required to make amends publicly and openly to the
“poor and ignoble” (XXII). This public exoneration of one’s
reputation was necessary because public honor comprised much of
a person’s reputation. Hoffman’s understanding of honor also
affected his definition of the lawyer’s duty to his clients. The
lawyer was “zealous and industrious” in his representation of his
clients (XVIII). But the meaning of “zealous and industrious”
representation was framed in light of the lawyer’s honor. Hoffman
sensibly urged lawyers to refuse to make “frivolous and vexatious
defences” (X), but also then suggested lawyers refuse to make any
claim or defense that “ought not, to be sustained,” for aiding a
client then “would be lending myself to a dishonourable use of
legal means” (XI).
Honor also led Hoffman to include resolutions declining to
plead the statute of limitations (XII) or the defense of infancy as
the sole defense against an honest demand (XIII), even though he
was aware that the law permitted those defenses: “I shall claim to
be the sole judge (the pleas not being compulsory) of the occasions
proper for their use.” 124 Further, Hoffman urged that a lawyer not
123Id.

at 763.
at 755. See also The Good Advocate, 1 J.L. 58, 58 (1830): “The good advocate is
one who will not plead the cause wherein his tongue must be confuted by his

124Id.
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“use my endeavours to arrest, or to impede the course of justice, by
special resorts to ingenuity” those charged with crimes, the
evidence of which left “no just doubt of their guilt” (XV). To
defend one of “atrocious character,” one who had “violated the
laws of God and man,” left him “entitled to no such special
exertions from any member of our pure and honourable
profession.” The most one could undertake for such a man was “a
fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause.” 125
The understanding of the lawyer’s duty of zealous
representation was undergoing a transition in the 1830s. A
Philadelphia lawyer named David Paul Brown wrote in his 1856
memoir, “A lawyer is not morally responsible for the act or motive
of a party, in maintaining an unjust cause, ... [but] he is morally
responsible, if he does it knowingly, however he may ‘plate sin
with gold.’” 126 Brown was a zealous advocate whose career
spanned the shift from an ethic of honor to an ethic of conscience.
In his Golden Rules for the Examination of Witnesses, he wrote
regarding cross-examination: “[In] all this, never be unmindful of
your own dignity. Bring to bear all the powers of your mind—not
that you may shine, but that virtue may triumph and your cause
may prosper.” 127 In 1832, he represented Lucretia Chapman,
accused of murdering her husband by poisoning him. Brown
represented Chapman with such zeal that the prosecutor believed
he had “overstepped the bounds of courtroom propriety.” 128 And
he obtained a not guilty verdict. Brown and others, including
George Sharswood, hid behind the word “knowingly,” and the
phrase “maintaining an unjust cause.” If the lawyer did not know
the cause was unjust, he could continue to act in behalf of the
conscience.” The Journal of Law was based in Philadelphia. For a sensitive and
clear-eyed assessment of the views of lawyers from Hoffman’s time to the
present on this question, see Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
“Technical” Defenses: Ethics, Morals, and the Lawyer as Friend, 14 Clin. L. Rev. 337
(2007).
125Hoffman, LEGAL STUDY, at 756. Hoffman was involved in one well-known
criminal case, but his practice was largely a civil practice. See Sleeman, David
Hoffman, in DAVID HOFFMAN: LIFE, LETTERS, AND LECTURES, at 25.
126David Paul Brown, 2 THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT THE
PHILADELPHIA BAR 30 (2 vols. Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856).
127David Paul Brown, Golden Rules for the Examination of Witnesses, in James Ram,
A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY 311 (1st Amer. ed. John
Townshend ed. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1870).
128Linda Wolfe, THE MURDER OF DR. CHAPMAN: THE LEGENDARY TRIALS OF
LUCRETIA CHAPMAN AND HER LOVER 198 (2004).
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client, allowing the law to shape the verdict. In defending one
accused of a crime (rather than aiding a plaintiff or defendant in
maintaining an unjust cause), lawyers writing in the 1840s and
1850s required defense counsel to exercise zeal even when the
defendant had confessed his guilt to the lawyers. 129 This specific
issue arose in the infamous Courvoisier case in London in 1840. 130
Courvoisier, a servant, killed his master. Before the second
day of a three-day trial, he confessed his guilt to his barrister,
Charles Phillips, but refused to plead guilty. 131 After informing
trial judge Baron Parke of Courvoisier=s confession, Phillips was
told to continue to defend Courvoisier, using “all fair arguments
arising on the evidence.” 132 Courvoisier was found guilty and
sentenced to die. During the very short period before he was
hanged, he publicly confessed his guilt, again and again. On at
least one occasion Courvoisier included in his public confession
the fact that before his conviction he had told Phillips he
committed murder. Although one early newspaper praised Phillips
for defending Courvoisier with “honourable zeal,” 133 a letter to the
Times (London), published five days after the trial ended, stated
that “he who defends the guilty, knowing him to be so, forgets
alike honour and honesty.” 134 A decade later, Phillips’s actions
were the subject of extensive commentary in Littell’s Living Age, a
general American weekly, and the Monthly Law Reporter, a
practical American legal publication. 135 The propriety of Phillips’s
actions was again addressed, and American and British lawyers
generally agreed they owed a duty to defend the factually guilty
client with honorable zeal, contrary to the letter to the Times.
Hoffman knew his resolutions that a lawyer refuse to
defend on the grounds of infancy or the statute of limitations were
not accepted lawyer behavior. First, Hoffman himself had been
129See

Sharswood, COMPEND OF LECTURES, at 31-33.
David Mellinkoff, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973); see also Ariens, Age
of Anxiety, at 375-80.
131Courvoisier was apparently able to use expensive and well-known counsel
through the beneficence of Sir George Beaumont, who employed as his butler
Courvoisier’s uncle. See Judith Flanders, THE INVENTION OF MURDER: HOW THE
VICTORIANS REVELLED IN DEATH AND DETECTION AND CREATED MODERN CRIME 202
n.* (2013).
132Mellinkoff, CONSCIENCE, at 139-40.
133Id. at 141 (quoting License of Counsel, CHRONICLE (London), June 22, 1840).
134Id. at 142 (quoting TIMES (London), June 25, 1840).
135See Ariens, Age of Anxiety, at 379-80 (discussing published articles).
130See
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involved in a case in 1830 in which the opposing party
successfully pled the statute of limitations. 136 Second, attorneys
had successfully pled the statute of limitations in Maryland since
1808. 137 A statute of limitations defense was acknowledged in the
Maryland Court of Appeals at least twenty-three times between
1808 and 1835. Third, Maryland lawyers successfully made an
infancy defense as early as 1820, 138 and a classic infancy case was
decided in 1833 by the Court of Appeals, which heard the case
after a decision by the equity chancellor holding the infancy
defense properly invoked. 139 Hoffman was well aware his
Resolutions instructed a lawyer not to make on his client’s behalf a
permissive but dishonorable legal argument. The lawyer decided
how far to go in representing a client, and defending a client on the
sole ground of the statute of limitations was dishonorable, an act of
knavery. A lawyer was never a mere agent of a client, and he acted
to meet the standards of honor, not the more practical (or possibly
venal) interests of his client. Consequently, that a lawyer could
defend on grounds of the statute of limitations or infancy did not
make those actions honorable. And a lawyer who valued his honor
would not make such pleas.
Thus, the mortar that bound Hoffman’s Resolutions was the
concept of honor. Honor required a lawyer to decline to make legal
claims that “ought not, to be sustained.” 140 The ethic of honor
joined private and public morality, for a gentleman’s identity was
dependent on his public reputation. Hoffman and other Maryland
lawyers of this time were gentlemen, and their reputation rested on
their public actions. A lawyer both exercised “honourable zeal” in
representing a client and acted to obtain “substantial justice to all
parties.” 141 In addition to using “honor” and its cognates thirteen
times in his introductory essay, Hoffman used “honourable” or its
opposite, “dishonourable,” eleven times in the Resolutions.

136State,

to Use of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Boyd, 2 G. & J. 365, 1830 WL
1662 (Md. 1830).
137Ratrie v. Sanders, 2 H. & J. 327 (Md. 1808)(upholding statute of limitations claim
in replevin suit). The court considered and rejected the limitations defense in
another 1808 case, see Poe v. Conway Adm’r, 2 H. & J. 307 (Md. 1808).
138Davis v. Jacquin, 5 H. & J. 100 (Md. 1820).
139Clagett v. Salmon, 5 G. & J. 314 (Md. 1833).
140Hoffman, LEGAL STUDY, at 754.
141See Bloomfield, Republican Legal Culture, at 684-85.

LOST AND FOUND

30

Hoffman’s views quickly faded. In American law journals
of the 1840s, lawyers discussed the propriety of lawyer actions in
terms of conscience. 142 In a speech to the 1844 law class of
Cincinnati College, Timothy Walker defended a lawyer’s
representation of “a bad cause” on rule of law grounds, and stated
that as long as a lawyer took “no dishonorable advantage, I stand
justified at the bar of my own conscience, whatever others may
think of my conduct.” 143 The Monthly Law Reporter asked in 1846
“to be delivered from self-styled conscientious lawyers, who will
engage for no parties that are not morally right.” 144 George
Sharswood’s 1854 A Compend of Lectures discussed how to
“assist the [lawyer’s] mind in coming to a safe conclusion in foro
conscientiae, in the discharge of his professional duty”
representing a client. 145
Once the lawyer agreed to represent a client, he did so with
“warm zeal.” 146 Sharswood used Courvoisier as a paradigmatic
example of a lawyer acting ethically because he represented to the
best of his abilities a client who had privately confessed his
guilt. 147 An 1858 review of David Paul Brown’s The Forum in the
Southern Literary Messenger echoed this view. 148 The unnamed
author wrote a bit about Brown but largely tackled the larger issue
of “the ethics of the legal profession.” He made several points that
suggested Hoffman’s ethical precepts spoke to a past ideal. First,
although the article positively cites Hoffman’s “excellent treatise
on a course of legal study,” it does so only to quote Hoffman’s
view that law students should be acquainted with the Bible, not to
discuss Hoffman’s Resolutions. 149 Second, the article distinguishes
between the legal ethics of undertaking an “unjust cause” (bad)
with the “extreme case” that “even the guilty man should be
defended” (good). 150 The latter is a right action not only because it
See Field, Study and Practice, at 340 (noting actions that may affect the lawyer’s
“conscience”); The Lawyer, His Character, &c., 2 Penn L.J. 185, 187
(1843)(reprinting Irish book review on lawyer behavior and noting “principle of
conscience” in lawyers).
143Walker, Ways and Means, at 547. .
144The Practice of the Bar, 9 Monthly L. Rep. 241, 241 (1846).
145 Sharswood, A COMPEND, at 30. In foro conscientiae, “in the tribune of
conscience,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
146Id. at 24.
147Sharswood, COMPEND OF LECTURES, at 40-43.
148Christianity in the Legal Profession, 27 SO. LIT. MESSENGER 66 (July 1858).
149Id. at 68.
150Id. at 70-72.
142
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is a Christian action but also because defending the guilty client by
the law acts to repel the perfidy of lynch law. Third, while
rejecting Lord Brougham’s view that a lawyer is loyal to his client
even if such action would “involve his country in confusion for his
client’s protection,” 151 the author generally defends the practice of
law, including criminal law, as “a high and honourable and
Christian calling.” 152 Fourth, the author notes that the “extreme
case” of the guilty client is “usually put to the lawyer as a test of
conscience.” 153 In each of these examples, conscience is an inner
test of one’s identity, based on the individual’s own standards, not
society’s. Hoffman uses the word “conscience” just three times in
his writing on professional deportment, compared with twenty-four
uses of “honor” or a variant. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown notes about
the end of the ideal of honor in the mid-nineteenth century, “[i]n
moral terms, conscience replaced honor, guilt replaced shame, that
is, inner self-controls rather than public opinion were supposed to
govern how one acted.” 154 This change made Hoffman of some
slight continuing interest to practicing lawyers (his view on the
importance of avoiding lawyer-client conflicts of interest remains
valuable today), but of little use when lawyers considered the
bounds of the ethics of advocacy.
Hoffman was fifty-one when the second edition of A
Course of Legal Study was published. His last law lecture had been
given over three years earlier, and although listed as a lawyer in
the annual Baltimore Directory, his law practice was moribund.

151Id.

at 71. As prince and before his arranged marriage to Queen Caroline,
George IV had secretly and unlawfully married a Catholic widow, Mrs.
Fitzherbert. If publicly learned, George forfeited his crown. In defending Queen
Caroline against George’s petition for a divorce on the ground of adultery,
Brougham implicitly threatened exposure of that fact by stating in part, “an
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client.” See 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (New York, James
Cockcroft & Co. 1874). Brougham’s views were largely rejected until the
development of the modern American legal profession in the 1960s. See generally
Michael Ariens, Brougham’s Ghost (forthcoming). Geoffrey Hazard’s claim that
Brougham’s statement represented “the basic narrative” of the American legal
profession “for over two centuries” is wrong. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991).
152Christianity in the Legal Profession, at 71.
153Id. at 72. See also Brooke, THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at 14 (“[T]he question is,
whether, in such cases, a lawyer can, with a good conscience, prosecute the legal
claim, directly against the moral right.”).
154Wyatt-Brown, Honor, in AMERICAN THOUGHT, at 311.
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What was worse for Hoffman’s reputation was the
evanescent reaction to the second edition. Just two reviews were
published: 155 The Boston-based American Jurist and Law
Magazine published a lengthy (twenty pages) review of the second
edition, but spent merely the final paragraph on Hoffman=s
Resolutions. 156 The second significant review was in the Biblical
Repertory and Princeton Review. 157 Much of that review was an
extended digression on the value of study for ministers in training.
The remainder praised Hoffman’s rules of professional
deportment, but instead of analyzing them, merely quoted many
Resolutions favorably, including those in which Hoffman refused
to make a statute of limitations defense, an infancy defense, or in
using the “artifices of eloquence” to aid those of “atrocious
character.”
Hoffman’s Miscellaneous Thoughts was published the next
year. The North American Review ostensibly reviewed it, but spent
the bulk of its review praising the second edition of A Course of
Legal Study. 158 The review did not, however, discuss Hoffman’s
fifty Resolutions. The second edition was little else reviewed.
Hoffman’s excuse was that the 1836 edition “was only very
partially published.” 159
A Course of Legal Study was reprinted in 1846. The same
year his book Hints on the Professional Deportment of Lawyers
was published, which reprinted Hoffman’s previous material on
legal ethics. By then, legal and literary publishing had changed
dramatically. Neither the American Jurist and Law Magazine nor
the Philadelphia-based American Law Magazine existed. The
Hoffman received from the North American Review (which had published
Joseph Story=s thirty-three page review of the first edition) was a simple notice of
publication alongside other books See Quarterly List of New Publications, 43 N. AM.
REV. 283, 285 (1836). Unsurprisingly, the United States Magazine and Democratic
Review did not review the second edition.
156See F.J.T., Hoffman’s Course of Legal Study, 15 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 321 (1836).
That paragraph indicated its delight with the resolutions and noted that “[u]pon
a future occasion we design to make this division the test for a separate article.”
Id. at 341. No such article was ever published.
157Charles Hodge, Review, 9 BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REV. 509 (1837).
158Grumbler’s Miscellaneous Thoughts, 45 N. AM. REV. 482, 482 (1837).
159David Hoffman, LEGAL STUDY, at iii (2d ed. Philadelphia, Thomas,
Cowperthwait & Co. 1846). He made the same claim in David Hoffman, HINTS
ON THE PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS 3 (Philadelphia, Thomas,
Cowperthwait & Co. 1846).
155All
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Monthly Law Reporter, published in Boston, the Pennsylvania Law
Journal and the Legal Intelligencer, both published in
Philadelphia, the Cincinnati-based Western Law Journal, and the
New York Legal Observer were the only published law journals.
All were written to provide practical advice to practicing lawyers.
None printed articles on broad jurisprudential topics. And Whigoriented publications such as the North American Review and the
American Whig Review took no notice of the reprinted A Course of
Legal Study or Hints. At the back of Miscellaneous Thoughts the
publisher listed reviews of the 1836 edition of A Course of Legal
Study. 160 After listing several positive French and English reviews,
the publisher wrote, “The American notices of this second edition
are equally numerous and laudatory.” 161 But these “numerous”
reviews consisted of merely of mentions of the reviews listed
above, a brief review by the National Gazette, a reprinting in the
Baltimore American of the North American Review’s final
paragraph, and a letter to the editor of the Baltimore American
commending readers to the London Law Review’s assessment. In
fine, it was a slender selection.
Michael Hoeflich has traced the price of A Course of Legal
Study from the 1840s through 1860. 162 He found its price slightly
declining over time, even in more remote parts of the nation. One
reason for this decline was its “lost popularity.” 163
In 1835, a British lawyer named Samuel Warren published
A Popular and Practical Introduction to Law Studies. 164 The
second edition was published in 1845 and the third in 1863 in
England. 165 The first American edition of Warren’s book was
published in Philadelphia in 1836. 166 Warren’s emphasis on the
“popular” and the “practical” was a world away from Hoffman’s
intellectually wide-ranging A Course of Legal Study. Warren’s
160See

Notices of the Legal Study, at 7-11. The identical notice is also found in
Notices at the end of David Hoffman, VIATOR; OR, A PEEP INTO MY NOTE BOOK
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1841)(Notices, at 7-11.).
161Id. at 8 in both MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS and VIATOR.
162M. H. Hoeflich, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 66-67 (2010).
163Id. at 67.
164Samuel Warren, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES
(London, A. Maxwell 1835).
165C. R. B. Dunlop, Samuel Warren: A Victorian Law and Literature Practitioner,
12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 265, 271 (2000).
166Samuel Warren, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES
(Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1836).
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Introduction became popular in the United States, eclipsing A
Course of Legal Study. 167 And in 1848 Warren’s book The Moral,
Social, and Professional Duties of Attornies [sic] and Solicitors 168
was published. Hoffman was ignored by popular magazines and
professionally displaced by Warren.
As for Hints, it had no impact whatsoever. It was neither
reviewed in any law publications nor in any of the usual literary
magazines. It just disappeared. In 1847, Hoffman moved to
England. He returned to the United States in 1854, the year in
which he died.
III. LOST
A. Forgotten
Hoffman’s influence waned because his views of
professional deportment represented the past. 169 By the 1850s,
most lawyers who wrote about legal ethics rejected the centrality
of honor in favor of conscience, and conscience allowed the lawyer
to bond more tightly (though not exclusively) with the interests of
his client. Lawyers sometimes justified this change by citing
Sharswood, as Sharswood’s views echoed those of most other
lawyers writing on the subject. American lawyers implicitly
concluded Hoffman’s Resolutions ill-fit the times.
Sharswood was a life-long Philadelphian. He was
appointed an associate judge of the district court in 1845, and three
years later was named its president judge. 170 In October 1850, he
167Hoeflich,

LEGAL PUBLISHING, at 67; Edwin C. Surrency, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW PUBLISHING 158 (1990).
168Samuel Warren, THE MORAL, SOCIAL, AND PROFESSIONAL DUTIES OF ATTORNIES
AND SOLICITORS (Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons 1848).
169Steve Sheppard thoughtfully suggested to me that Hoffman also faded because
his books lacked a proper institutional platform as well as that his approach to
law and legal study was anachronistic.
170On the Philadelphia bar of this time, see Gary B. Nash, The Philadelphia Bench
and Bar: 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 203 (1965); Sidney George Fisher,
The Diary of Sidney George Fisher Covering the Years 1834-1871, in A PHILADELPHIA
PERSPECTIVE 402 (Nicholas B. Wainwright ed. 1967). See generally Robert R. Bell,
THE PHILADELPHIA LAWYER: A HISTORY, 1735-1945, at 106-56 (1992).
On Sharswood, see Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS at 121, 132; Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood--Teacher and Friend, 55
AM. L. REG. O.S. 401 (1907); Francis S. Philbrick, Sharswood, George, in
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gave his first lecture as Professor at the newly reinstituted
Department of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. 171
In 1854, Sharswood began his law school lectures with a
focus on legal ethics. 172 This lecture became part of A Compend of
Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of Law,
published late in the year. In addition to informing students, “High
moral principle is [the young lawyer’s] only safe guide,” 173 he
concluded by cautioning the listener to beware that “these objects
of ambition, wealth, learning, honor, and influence, worthy though
they be, [are of but] factitious importance.” 174
Sharswood accepted the position that the lawyer “is not
merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court.” 175 Even
so, the lawyer was “not morally responsible for the act of the party
in maintaining an unjust cause,” for the lawyer’s role was to assist
the court and jury in reaching its decision. “The lawyer, who
refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case
is unjust and indefensible, usurps the function of both judge and
jury.” 176 These conclusions were all contrary to Hoffman.
Sharswood believed it was the duty of the lawyer to plead
the statute of limitations on behalf of the client, even when the
client “knows that he honestly owes the debt sued for and that the
delay has been caused by indulgence or confidence on the part of
his creditor.” 177 Though the client “ought not to plead the statute,”
if he wished to do so, the lawyer should plead it, and the case was
decided on the law. 178 He also accepted the duty of the lawyer to
represent the guilty client, for such a person should be convicted
only upon “legal evidence.” 179 The limits of the defense lawyer’s
17 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 28 (Dumas Malone ed. 1943); Joel
Fishman, Sharswood, George, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AMER. LAW at 491.
171George Sharswood, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW 37
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1870).
172George Sharswood, COMPEND OF LECTURES, at I; see also Edwin R. Keedy, George
Sharswood--Professor of Law, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 692 (1950)(describing lecture
and noting its publication history).
173Sharswood, COMPEND OF LECTURES, at 9.
174Id. at 106.
175Id. at 26.
176Id.
177Id. at 25-26.
178 Id. at 26.
179 Id. at 31.
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representation were as expressed in Courvoisier: “It is his duty,
however, as an advocate merely, as Baron Parke has well
expressed it, to use ALL FAIR ARGUMENTS ARISING ON THE
EVIDENCE.” 180
Sharswood avoided canons, resolutions, rules, and the like.
His statement of high moral principle in the practice of law
remained in essay form. His acceptance of a greater though not
exclusive focus on the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation of
his client fit the times, and went well beyond Hoffman’s honorbased interpretation of the lawyer’s duty to a client. 181 The second
edition, titled an Essay on Professional Ethics, was published in
1860, and the fifth edition was published in 1884, a year after
Sharswood died. During the thirty years between the first through
the fifth edition, Sharswood’s Essay was the dominant source for
understanding legal ethics.
B. Other Voices
A number of legal ethics essays, lectures, and printed
speeches from 1854 through the end of the nineteenth century used
Sharswood’s Essay as their guide. Those that didn=t largely echoed
Sharswood’s views that (1) a lawyer representing a client in a civil
matter owed a duty to a client to use any proper legal claim or
defense, such as the statute of limitations or the defense of infancy,
and (2) a lawyer representing a person in a criminal matter owed
him the duty of zealous representation, for no man should be
convicted except upon legal evidence, and the lawyer was “to
suggest all those reasonable doubts which may arise from the
evidence as to his guilt, and to see that if he is convicted, it is
according to law.” 182 This latter duty, while breaking from
Hoffman, did not extend as far as Lord Brougham’s view of
zeal. 183 When legal authors and speakers looked for an ethical
180Id.

at 44.
Ariens, Age of Anxiety, at 375-94. An appeal couched in very similar terms
is found in John D. Works, Open Letters, 37 THE CENTURY 475, 475-76 (Jan.
1889)(“But the distinction between legal and moral right should not be
overlooked.... For example, a debt may be barred by the statute of limitations.
The defendant who is sued is in a moral sense still liable, as the debt is unpaid;
but the statute of limitations having run, he has a legal defense which his
attorney is bound, as a matter of duty, to interpose for him.”).
182Sharswood, COMPEND OF LECTURES, at 25-27, 31.
183Id. at 29 (quoting and criticizing Brougham). See also William P. Wells, THE
CONDITIONS OF THE LAWYER=S USEFULNESS 10 (Ann Arbor, John Moore
181See
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counterpoint with which they disagreed, most used Brougham’s
speech in Queen Caroline’s case. None mentioned Hoffman’s less
ambitious understanding of honorable zeal, and only a few urged
that position without naming Hoffman.
For example, William Allen Butler’s February 1871 talk to
a New York audience, 184 published later that year as Lawyer and
Client: Their Relations, Rights, and Duties, stated the view
adopted by most lawyers of Brougham’s speech: “This was a high
and somewhat rapid flight of oratory, far beyond any justifiable
limit of duty or privilege. ... It is rarely quoted, except to be
condemned.” 185 Other postbellum writers echoed Butler’s view.
Henry Sedgwick urged lawyers to “[f]orget the fallacious
eloquence of Brougham.” 186 And Theodore Bacon summarized the
consensus view in 1888: “I do not deem it important here to
controvert the extraordinary proposition enunciated by Lord
Brougham upon the trial of Queen Caroline.... [I]t has seldom since
been approvingly cited, unless by some advocate maintaining an
unconscionable cause by reprehensible methods.” 187
1875)(rejecting view that lawyer is solely an agent of client). The extent of the
shift in understanding of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to client in the late
nineteenth century is contestable. Compare Ariens, Age of Anxiety, at 394-407
with Mark DeWolfe Howe, Book Review, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 840-41 (1947).
184See Local Miscellany, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1871, at 8 (noting
delivery of third in series of lectures by Butler on “relations arising between
lawyer and client” and adopting view that lawyer does not know the cause is
bad until decided by a Judge, but rejecting Brougham’s approach).
185William Allen Butler, LAWYER AND CLIENT: THEIR RELATION, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES
41-42 (New York, D. Appleton and Co. 1871).
186Henry D. Sedgwick, THE RELATION AND DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE STATE,
LECTURE BEFORE THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FEBRUARY 9TH, 1872 at 16 (New York, Baker & Godwin 1872).
187Theodore Bacon, Professional Ethics, 17 J. SOC. SCI. 37, 41 (1883). Other similar
statements from the late nineteenth century are found in Hon. Dorman B. Eaton,
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DUTIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE ALUMNI AND GRADUATING CLASSES OF THE YALE LAW
SCHOOL, AT ITS FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY, JUNE 27TH, 1882 at 22-23 (New Haven,
Hodgson & Robinson 1882)(“No language can too strongly reprobate so
detestable and barbarous a code of professional ethics, more becoming a band of
pirates or brigands than a Christian officer of justice.”); Hon. Edward M. Paxson,
THE ROAD TO SUCCESS, OR PRACTICAL HINTS TO THE JUNIOR BAR: AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA 9 (Philadelphia, Law
Academy 1888)(rejecting Brougham); Richard Harris, HINTS ON ADVOCACY IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 162-63 (3d Amer. ed. from 6th Eng. ed. William L.
Murfree, Sr., rev’r., St. Louis, William H. Stevenson 1884)(“Lord Brougham’s
authority, however, on this point is very generally controverted”); Henry Wade
Rogers, ADDRESS TO THE LAW CLASS OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, JUNE 17, 1886 at 24
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Late nineteenth century lawyers implicitly and explicitly
followed Sharswood in supporting zealous representation on “rule
of law” grounds. Joseph Cox concluded that a lawyer who believes
his client is guilty of the crime charged maintains a duty to
represent the client to effectuate the end that “[o]ur government is
one of law.” 188 This argument was echoed the following year by
Joseph Works in a long letter to the editors of The Century:
Very few thoughtful men, whether lawyers or not,
will at the present day contend that a lawyer
violates any rules of professional ethics or commits
any wrong to society by defending a criminal whom
he knows to be guilty. To be tried and defended by
counsel, in open court, is a constitutional right
expressly guaranteed to every person charged with a
criminal offense. No one, whether his attorney or
not, has a right to assume his guilt. The law
presumes his innocence. If he is unable to employ
an attorney, the court must appoint one to conduct
his defense. The attorney has no legal or moral right
to refuse to defend him on the ground that he knows
him to be guilty, whether he is employed by the
defendant or appointed by the court to appear for
him. This duty requires him to make the defense for
him fairly and justly, in the interest of society as
well as of the prisoner. 189

(n.p. 1886)(“I think that both the judgment and the conscience of the profession
reject the extreme opinion which was expressed by Lord Brougham in Queen
Caroline’s case.”).
A few late nineteenth century writers considered the context of Brougham’s
speech, as did Sharswood. Noting that Brougham was defending Queen Caroline
in a divorce demanded by King George IV, the editors of the Southern Law Review
wrote, “[W]e imagine that [Brougham’s] motive for advancing so extreme a
theory was to palliate, in the eyes of the King, the vehemence of his advocacy
against the King, by making it appear that he felt himself compelled thereto by
his conceptions of an advocate’s duty.” About the Profession and Practice of the Law,
1 SO. L. REV. O.S. 249, 279 (1872).
188Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 8 OHIO ST. B. ASS’N REP. 95, 105-06 (1888).
189Works, Open Letters, at 476. See also D. H. Chamberlain, SOME OF THE PRESENT
NEEDS AND DUTIES OF OUR PROFESSION 12, 14 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons
1888)(same). The “rule of law” view was contrasted by those who facilitated the
rise of lynching in the postbellum period. See generally Michael J. Pfeifer, ROUGH
JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1874-1947 at 94-121 (2004).
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Butler’s Lawyer and Client exemplified the shift between
public honor and private conscience in thinking about “how far the
lawyer is amenable for the conduct of his client=s case.” Butler
noted that the lawyer was required to act in accordance with any
rules of the court, and that he was subject to praise or
condemnation by the public as long as it avoided a decision based
on mere passion and properly understood the case. “But the lawyer
is amenable, first of all, last of all, and most of all, to his own
conscience.” 190 Henry Wade Rogers urged the 1886 University of
Michigan law class to avoid any professional behavior that would
“shock an enlightened conscience,” 191 and cited Rufus Choate on
the view that no lawyer possessed a “duty to go into court, and
contrary to his convictions assert what he did not believe to be
true.” 192 In discussing the distrust of lawyers among the public,
including “highly intelligent men,” Richard Harris noted the
argument was “that several practices usual at the bar are contrary
to good conscience.” 193 This shift, however, was not unanimous. In
an 1882 speech, Theodore Bacon, after rejecting Brougham, rejects
Sharswood on the grounds of honor. Sharswood believed a lawyer
remained duty-bound to represent a client if, after taking on the
matter, the lawyer found “his ardor chilled by dishonoring
disclosures” of the client. In such a case, Bacon concluded
Sharswood’s belief that the lawyer was required to continue
representing the client was wrong. In Bacon’s view, “I cannot,
therefore, distinguish between a case which honorable counsel
ought not to undertake with a knowledge of its character, and a
case which, once undertaken, turns out to be of such a character.”
And if a “lawyer of good repute” withdrew in such a case, any
adverse consequence properly fell on the client, not the lawyer. 194
But Bacon’s use of honor was a minority view.
190Local

Miscellany, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 1871, at 8; Butler, LAWYER
at 64. See also Bacon, Professional Ethics, at 39 (worrying that “if a
lawyer’s conscience or a lawyer’s honesty comes to be a current jest” then the
legal profession’s “moral debasement” will contaminate “the whole body of
society”). Cf. Senator Wm. E. Chandler, ADDRESS BEFORE THE GRAFTON AND COOS
BAR ASSOCIATION, JANUARY 6, 1888 at 13 (Concord, Republican Press Ass’n
1888)(citing Butler on duty to “win victory ... by all means which stop short of
personal and professional dishonor”).
191Rogers, ADDRESS, at 23 (quoting uncited statement).
192Id. at 24.
193Harris, HINTS ON ADVOCACY, at 157.
194Bacon, Professional Ethics, at 43-44. A similar view is expressed in Eaton, Public
Relations, at 23 (quoting without citing Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson in
Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845): “The high and honorable office of
AND CLIENT,
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The editors of the Southern Law Review favorably quoted
Sharswood on why a lawyer’s understanding of duty was not
contrary to the public’s interest: “‘The lawyer,’ says Judge
Sharswood, ‘is not merely the agent of the party: he is an officer of
the court.’” 195 Publicly, nearly all lawyers by 1900 agreed that a
lawyer zealously represented his client, but never acted solely as
the client’s agent. 196 The “hired gun” model was never promoted,
and was regularly denounced by the elite bar, even as lawyers
recognized that “pettifoggers” and “shysters” might be willing to
do most anything for a client. 197
In all of the printed speeches and written articles
concerning the American legal profession from the 1860s through
1900, including its standing and standards, none mentioned David
Hoffman or his Resolutions. He was simply not a part of any
debate on American legal ethics.
Counsel would be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he compelled to do the
biddings of his client against the dictates of his conscience.”). See also Hon.
George W. McCrary, THE TRUE LAWYER 10 (Kansas City, H. N. Farey & Co.
1886)(following implicitly approach of Sharswood, and declaring it took a trial to
determine which side was right and which was wrong, but also speaking
repeatedly in terms of honor).
195About the Profession, 1 SO. L. REV. at 279.
196But this message was lost to some. See John Dos Passos, THE AMERICAN LAWYER
142 (1907)(rejecting Brougham’s doctrine, but concluding “yet it has been relied
on over and over again by lawyers, to cover all kinds of dishonest practices and
defenses.”).
197See Charles Edwards, PLEASANTRIES ABOUT COURTS AND LAWYERS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 128 (New York, Richardson and Co. 1867)(noting judge, jury,
witnesses and spectators were not “displeased that the old greasy pettifogger
had the worst of it”); Henry Warren Williams, LEGAL ETHICS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR YOUNG COUNSEL 206 (1906)(“The needs of one’s client can never relieve
against crime. Such offences as perjury, the corruption of jurors, of witnesses,
and the abstraction of papers from the files, which are too frequently committed
and which are sometimes connived at by a certain class of practitioners, cannot
be defended on such grounds, either before the law or in morals.”). Published in
1906, Williams wrote in the late nineteenth century. See also Cait Murphy,
SCOUNDRELS IN LAW: THE TRIALS OF HOWE AND HUMMEL, LAWYERS TO THE
GANGSTERS, COPS, STARLETS, AND RAKES WHO MADE THE GILDED AGE
(2010)(discussing the law firm of Howe and Hummel and its use of the methods
noted by Williams); Richard H. Rovere, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND
SCANDALOUS HISTORY (1947)(same). See also John A. Farrell, CLARENCE DARROW:
ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 141 (2011)(noting Darrow’s defense of lawyers
charged with bribing jurors in 1906 and comment by former law partner that in
some personal injury cases in which Darrow represented plaintiffs, “It was
bribery all around.”).

LOST AND FOUND

41

C. Treatises on Ethics
The first treatise on legal ethics was written by Edward
Weeks and published in 1878. 198 Although a lengthy 698 pages,
one reviewer noted, “We do not find much information as to what
things may be done by attorney [sic], and what not, in criminal
cases.” 199 Weeks’s Treatise cited Sharswood once, and Hoffman
not at all. It followed their general view that the lawyer was not
merely an agent of the client: “But a client has no right to control
his attorney in the due and orderly conduct of a suit; and it is his
duty to do what the court would order to be done, though his client
instruct him otherwise.” 200 A second edition published in 1892 also
ignored both Hoffman and the issue of “what things may be done”
by a criminal defense attorney. 201
George Warvelle’s 1902 treatise on legal ethics looked
closely at the duties owed by a lawyer to client, court, opposing
parties, and to society. 202 In general, a lawyer’s duty was based on
the interiority of conscience, not honor accorded by others. Ethical
behavior “should be guided in a general way by recognized usages,
the prevailing moral sentiment, and the suggestions of his own
conscience.” 203 Warvelle specifically addressed the problem of the
lawyer’s knowledge of the “prisoner’s guilt,” accepted the
consensus view, and concluded with the statement approved of in
Courvoisier. 204 Similarly, Warvelle rejected Hoffman and followed
Sharswood and convention (without mentioning either) on using
the defense of the statute of limitations: The lawyer “is under a
duty to urge it in a suit brought to recover the debt.” 205 Finally,
Warvelle included in his Appendix a favorable summary of the
actions of Phillips in Courvoisier. 206 Hoffman was unmentioned.

198Edward P. Weeks, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW (San
Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1878).
199Book Notices, 13 AM. L. REV. 358, 359 (1879).
200Weeks, TREATISE, at 50.
201Charles Theodore Boone, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
(rev. 2d ed. San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney & Co. 1892).
202George P. Warvelle, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS (1902).
203Id. at 35.
204The lawyer may “use all fair arguments that may arise from the trial.” Id. at
136.
205Id. at 160.
206Id. at 211-16.
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Hoffman’s Resolutions was reprinted several times in the
first two decades of the twentieth century, initially by the
American Bar Association in 1907, and subsequently in a few
treatises and casebooks. 207 But none looked critically at the
substance of Hoffman’s Resolutions. The Resolutions was simply
published without comment.
And in general, that’s about all one heard about Hoffman
during the first seven-plus decades of the twentieth century. 208
IV. FOUND
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility and Crisis in the
American Legal Profession
In just three years after its 1969 adoption by the ABA, the
Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted as law by fortythree states and the District of Columbia. Four other state bar
associations made the Code applicable to its members. Just three
states rejected it. 209 Canon 7, one of the nine Canons comprising
the Code, declared, “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealous
Within the Bounds of the Law.” This conclusion was justified on
standard rule of law grounds. Any other approach would allow the
public to determine whether an unpopular cause or client would
find representation, and only full representation of the parties
allowed the case to be decided on informed and dispassionate
grounds. 210 Despite its extraordinary popularity, the Code was
207Report of the Comm. on Code of Prof. Ethics, 31 A.B.A. REP. 676, 717-35
(1907)(App. H); Hoffman’s Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, 2
AM. L. SCH. REV. 230 (1908); Gleason L. Archer, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE
LAWYER 317 (1910); George Purcell Costigan, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
LEGAL ETHICS 555 (1917). Although chapter II of Orrin N. Carter, ETHICS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1915) is titled “Historical,” neither Hoffman nor Sharswood is
mentioned.
208A Westlaw search found five mentions of Hoffman in law reviews from 19001965: Gleason L. Archer’s Ethics Obligations of the Lawyer, 24 HARV. L. REV. 413
(1911); Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice: Justice Bradley and Some of His
Colleagues, 1 STAN. L. REV. 217 (1949); Sutherland, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers;
John F. Sutton, Jr., Guidelines to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 391
(1961); and Note, Modern Trends in Legal Education, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 170 (1964).
Only three noted the Resolutions, and each did so in cursory fashion.
209Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
210See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A.
Rep. 729, 774 (1969).
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attacked early and often. An ABA Journal essay revealingly titled
The Myth of Legal Ethics, stated, “The Code of Professional
Responsibility, as the Canons of Professional Ethics before it, is a
treasure trove of moral platitudes.” 211 Even a sympathetic reader
found the Code “repeatedly biased in the ordering of its
priorities.” 212 These criticisms were a part of a larger crisis within
the American legal profession.
In the Preface to Unequal Justice (1976), Jerold Auerbach
wrote that the period between 1968 and 1974 were “terrible
years.” 213 Auerbach noted this period was a “coming apart,” “as
legitimate authority was stripped from one institution after another-from university, government, presidency, military, police, prisons,
courts, law.” 214
By early 1973, over two dozen lawyers were enmeshed in
the Watergate scandal. 215 In 1974, the Department of Justice filed
an antitrust suit against the ABA concerning several provisions of
the Code, 216 and the next year the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional minimum fee schedules. 217 Shortly thereafter, the
Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against the ABA
because the Code wholly banned lawyer advertising, 218 and in
1977, the Court held Arizona=s ban on all lawyer advertising
Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 203 (1978).
D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 702, 704 (1977).
213Jerold S. Auerbach, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA xii (paperback ed. 1977)(1976).
214Id. Auerbach is referencing William L. O=Neill, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960S (paper ed. 1971).
215See generally John J. Sirica, TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE
TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE PARDON (1979); Ken Gormley, ARCHIBALD COX:
CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 227-392 (paper ed. 1997). For contemporary critical
statements, see Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A. J. at 937 (“[I]f
Watergate has not tarnished the image of lawyers, at least it has acutely
intensified public consciousness of questions of legal ethics and professional
accountability.”); Lieberman, CRISIS AT THE BAR at 35 (“More than twenty-five
lawyers were formally named as defendants or co-conspirators in Watergate and
related criminal proceedings.”).
216See Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services Plans Get an
Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J. 791, 792-93 (1974); Justice
Department Continues Its Contentions That the Houston Amendments Raise Serious
Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A. J. 1410, 1410-14 (1974).
217Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 (1975).
218See Lawrence Walsh, The Annual Report of the President of the American Bar
Association, 62 A.B.A. J. 1119, 1120 (1976).
211Eric

212Thomas
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economically in the 1970s. 220
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Lawyers

also

suffered

The special committee drafting the Code pursued two
paths: “The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to
the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the
transgressor.” 221 For the “aspiring” the Code offered Ethical
Considerations. For the possible “transgressor” it provided
Disciplinary Rules. Both Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules were subordinate to the Code’s nine “axiomatic” Canons. By
mid-1977, the decision to include both Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules was directly attacked. L. Ray Patterson, then
Dean of Emory University Law School, wrote in the ABA Journal,
“The time has come to renounce completely the fiction that ethical
problems for lawyers are matters of ethics rather than law. The
fiction pervades the Code of Professional Responsibility and is its
major shortcoming.” 222
B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA created a Special Committee on the Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1977. 223 Although asked merely to
assess the Code, the Special Committee became the following year
the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, known
as the Kutak Commission after its chair, Robert Kutak. 224 The
Kutak Commission began working on Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which eliminated aspiring Ethical Considerations in favor
of the view of ethics problems as problems of law. As Kutak wrote
in 1983, “What lawyers ... have failed to appreciate is that ethics is
not what the Model Rules concern; the Model Rules are about the
law of lawyering.” 225

219Bates

v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
Richard A. Posner, OVERCOMING LAW 67 (1995)(noting “the price of legal
services fell (in real, that is, inflation-adjusted terms), rather than … rose []
between 1970 and 1985.”).
221Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, Preamble to Code
of Professional Responsibility, 94 A.B.A. REP. 729,731 (1969).
222Patterson, Wanted, at 639.
223See Annual Meeting Board of Governors, 103 A.B.A. REP. 581 (1977).
224See Annual Meeting Board of Governors, 104 A.B.A. REP. 646 (1978).
225Kutak, Law of Lawyering, at 413.
220See
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In the three years between the publication of the Discussion
Draft and the ABA’s adoption of the Model Rules, a strenuous
debate ensued concerning the extent of the lawyer’s duty to a
client. This particularly arose in the context of the lawyer’s duty to
disclose client information. The Discussion Draft, dated January
30, 1980, indicated in Rule 1.7 two instances in which a lawyer
“shall” disclose information, and four cases in which the lawyer
might disclose information about a client. 226
This provision in the Discussion Draft was attacked by
varied critics. 227 The Proposed Final Draft of the Kutak
Commission, released in May 1981, re-wrote the provision on the
lawyer’s duty to keep a client’s confidences. Moved to Rule 1.6,
the Kutak Commission eliminated any rule that required a lawyer
to disclose a client confidence. 228 This provision was only slightly
modified in the Proposed Final Draft. 229
The Model Rules displaced the view that ethical rules were
“matters of personal conscience” 230 by generating a “law of
lawyering,” legal ethics understood as positive law. The Model
Rules generally favored a lawyer’s duty of loyalty to a client
against the lawyer’s duty as an “officer of the court.” 231 Hoffman
226MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT

R. 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).
It was attacked in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, see W. William
Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer’s
Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 746 (1981) (citing
Editorial, A License to Squeal?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 20), and the RoscoePound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation offered an alternate code proposing
more stringent limits on disclosing client confidences. See Commission on
Professional Responsibility of The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer’s
Foundation, The American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct Public Discussion Draft-June
1980, TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44, 50.
228MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
229See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A.
REP. 828, 833 (1982)(reprinting Proposed Final Draft as Exhibit A).
230 Kalish, David Hoffman’s Essay, at 57.
231Cf. MODEL R. PROF’L COND. R. 3.3 cmt.[2](noting “the special duties of lawyers
as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the
adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative
proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force.
Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is
qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently,
although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an
impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause,
the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or
fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”).
227
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became a source for those attacking the liberal “role morality” of
lawyers, found in both the Code and the Rules, by reviving an
ethics of virtue, which such critics equated with Hoffman.
C. The Revival of David Hoffman
Beginning in the late 1970s, as the ABA moved to supplant
the Code with its Model Rules, Hoffman’s legal ethics became the
subject of law review articles, 232 particularly on the duty of lawyer
to society as well as client. Professor Stephen Kalish’s
commentary on the proposed Model Rules examined Hoffman’s
Resolutions to argue in support a stronger “officer of the court”
concept. L. Ray Patterson’s 1980 Legal Ethics article used
Hoffman and Sharswood to argue for a lawyer-client relationship
that went beyond an agency relationship, to what Patterson called a
“reciprocal agency model,” which accepted the concept that the
lawyer’s duty of loyalty to a client did not preclude the lawyer’s
duty as an officer of the court to others. 233
Another important contributor to the revival of David
Hoffman was Notre Dame law professor Thomas Shaffer. Shaffer
first discusses Hoffman=s legal ethics is in his book On Being a
Christian and a Lawyer (1981). 234 On Being a Christian was
published in the midst of the ABA’s tortuous debate on the Model
Rules, and was a corrective intended in part to refute the idea that
legal ethics was merely a type of law. The book’s overarching
purpose is to assess the issue of “role” in the behavior of lawyers
and clients, and the relationship between role and morality. As
Shaffer and Robert Cochran wrote elsewhere, “Our purposes ... are
to seek out and examine the moral standards clients and their
lawyers bring to the law office, to hold those standards up as better
than the minimum lawyer standards, and to identify a way that
lawyers and clients can talk about and apply their standards in the
law office on ordinary Wednesday afternoons.” 235 Shaffer’s
evaluation of Hoffman was neither to venerate nor to argue for
Hoffman’s ethical views, but to examine critically Hoffman’s ideas
in light of the dominant view that lawyers represented clients.
232Bloomfield, Republican Legal Culture; L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the
Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 Emory L.J. 909 (1980); Kalish, David Hoffman’s Essay.
233 Patterson, Legal Ethics, at 927, 965.
234Shaffer, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN. He does so particularly in Chapter Six, titled
The Problem of Representing the Guilty. See also Shaffer, Atticus Finch.
235Shaffer & Cochran, LAWYERS, at viii (Preface to First Edition).

LOST AND FOUND

47

Shaffer accurately perceived Hoffman as ignoring any role of
client conscience in the practice of law. In contrast, modern
adversary ethics largely ignored any moral claims made by lawyers
in representing clients. The legal profession was thus stuck
between the radically incomplete views that the role of lawyer was
solely as “agent” of or “godfather” 236 to the client. Shaffer
provides an incisive assessment of both Hoffman and Sharswood,
and concludes, “It is fair to say that modern standards would not
admit of Sharswood’s distinctions or Hoffman’s reservations” in
defending a guilty client. 237 Shaffer accepts the modern approach
to defending the guilty. He rejects its justifications.
After writing about Hoffman’s legal lectures in 1982, 238
Shaffer published an essay titled The Gentleman in Professional
Ethics in 1984. 239 Though Hoffman is referred to only tangentially,
Shaffer’s essay is a deeply knowledgeable study of the fatal flaws
of the ethic of the gentleman, of whom Hoffman was the
paradigmatic example. Shaffer’s assessment of Hoffman
culminated in his textbook American Legal Ethics (1985), which
included throughout Hoffman’s Resolutions. This textbook was
intended to nudge students to think about the everyday moral work
of lawyers rather than the boundaries of law enacted in the Model
Rules.
Yale law professor Geoffrey Hazard was the co-author of
The Law of Lawyering (1985). 240 He had reported the critical
comments of large firm lawyers that the Code was an outdated
relic in a 1978 book. 241 Hazard was also the Reporter for the
Model Rules. In a 1981 article defending the drafting process of
the Model Rules, Hazard explained the Commission’s rejection of
the tripartite structure of the Code in favor of rules, called the Code
“anachronistic,” 242 and concluded that Hoffman and Sharswood’s
“ethical guidance consisted of Victorian moralizing at its
236Shaffer

and Cochran delineated four approaches to moral issues in
representing clients: lawyer as godfather, lawyer as hired gun, lawyer as guru,
and lawyer as friend. See id. (Table of Contents).
237Shaffer, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN, at 68.
238Shaffer, David Hoffman=s Law School Lectures.
239Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 QUEEN’S L.J. 1 (19841985).
240Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (1985).
241Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 7 (1978).
242Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 RECORD B.
ASS’N CITY OF N.Y. 77, 82 (1981).
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worst.” 243 He explained that the “beginning point for the Kutak
Commission has been that adversarial representation of clients is in
the public interest.” 244 This last assertion was irrelevant. All earlier
legal ethics writers promoted adversarial representation as in the
public interest. That’s why nearly all nineteenth century lawyers
used the word “zeal” and justified defending the guilty client on
rule of law/anti-lynching grounds. The relevant question was,
when, if ever, does a lawyer’s duty as an “officer of the court” or
to others override the lawyer’s duty to zealous represent the client?
The answer in the Model Rules was, rarely.
Hazard distilled the recent historical movement in legal
ethics in a 1991 Yale Law Journal article. Legal ethics “norms
have become ‘legalized.’ The rules of ethics have ceased to be
internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of
public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary
process.” 245
D. The Professionalism Crisis
Hazard was right. Legal ethics were a matter of law, and
lawyers began seeking its boundaries. By 1980, “[t]he prevailing
notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty of loyalty
to the client is the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only

243Id.

at 81. Hazard wrongly dates Hoffman’s “ethical precepts” as from 1817.
Even if he correctly used 1836, this still predates Queen Victoria reign. And even
allowing for some chronological leeway, Hazard is simply wrong to declare
Hoffman’s or Sharswood’s views “Victorian,” unless the only meanings he
attributes to it are “old-fashioned” or “views I disagree with.”
244Id. at 93.
245Hazard, Future, at 1241. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics,
19 SO. ILL. U.L.J. 447, 453 (1995)(“‘Law’ and ‘morals’ are thus at opposite ends of
the normative spectrum in terms of form, mutual intelligibility, and as
mechanisms of personal and social action. In between law and morals are
‘ethics.’”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 244
(1998)(noting “traditional understanding” of legal profession that lawyer
conduct norms were rules of ethics rather than law). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. & Douglas W. Pinto, Jr., MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW 179
(2013)(concluding, “We yearn for latter-day Jethroes: ‘Able people such as fear
God, people of truth, hating covetousness.’”). For a thorough study, see Charles
W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I. Origins,
8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469 (2001); Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of
the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
205 (2002).
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duty of the lawyer.” 246 Several critics urged that lawyers seek an
ethic of justice, one that differed from “a professional vision based
only on client service and the bottom line.” 247 The liberal
conception was that an autonomous client selected her legal goals,
which the lawyer worked to effectuate. In this liberal view, lawyers
were thus not accountable to the public for the goals of their
clients, a view accepted in both Canon 7 of the Code and in the
Model Rules. Those promoting an ethics of virtue found the moral
nonaccountability of lawyers a fatally flawed understanding of
legal ethics. 248 Hoffman Resolutions was a contrary view of legal
ethics, founded in virtue.
In the last half of the l980s, the problem of the “moral
nonaccountability” of lawyers became acute, as some in the
profession reacted to perceived adversarial excesses. Just a year
after the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA created a
Commission on Professionalism to combat the possibility that “the
Bar might be moving away from the principles of professionalism
and that it was so perceived by the public.” 249 In 1986, the
Commission issued a report discussing the extensive changes to
the legal profession since 1960. The creation of more formal
disciplinary processes resulted in lawyers taking “the rules more
seriously” than before. 250 But the move from the Code to the Rules
also resulted in a tendency of lawyers “to look at nothing but the
rules.” 251 The House of Delegates resolved to distribute this Report
to law schools, judges, and state and local bar associations.
And the “professionalism” crusade began. 252 Two years
later, the ABA House of Delegates resolved that it recommend to
state and local bar associations that they adopt a lawyers’ creed of
Legal Ethics, at 918.
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, at xvii-xviii.
248See, e.g., Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, at xx.
249Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 111(2) A.B.A. REP. 369, 373 (1986). See
also ABA Comm’n on Professionalism, “Y In the Spirit of Public Service:” A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243
(1986)(reprinting report).
250Id. at 259. See also Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of
Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33 (2004-2005)(discussing history of reform of
lawyer disciplinary processes beginning with ABA’s 1970 Clark Report).
251“In the Spirit”, at 259.
252For a critical review, see Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the
Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995).
246Patterson,
247Luban,
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professionalism to battle “abuses” “fostered by an excessive zeal, a
‘win at any cost’ mentality, ‘scorched earth’ tactics and the
apotheosizing of ‘playing hard ball.’” 253 When it so resolved, the
House of Delegates added a second resolution: “That nothing
contained in such a creed shall be deemed to supersede or in any
way amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or other
disciplinary rules, alter existing standards of conduct against which
lawyer negligence might be judged or become a basis for the
imposition of civil liability of any kind.” 254 The second resolution
ensured that the lawyer’s creed of professionalism was not an
admonition to lawyers to “behave, or else.” Instead, it was
aspirational, just as the rejected Ethical Considerations of the 1969
Code were aspirational. That the ABA was reviving an approach
(disciplinary rules and ethical considerations) it had killed less than
a decade earlier did not appear confounding to it. The rules
remained the rules. Like other creeds, the lawyer’s creed was made
for believers, and was a matter of no concern to unbelievers.
Unlike other creeds, it was difficult to discern how lawyers could
use it to proselytize their fellow sisters and brothers of the bar.
Some states tried to avoid the problem of faith by making
professionalism a rule. In 2008, Arizona defined as
“unprofessional conduct” any “substantial or repeated violations of
the Oath of Admission to the Bar or the Lawyer’s Creed of
Professionalism of the State Bar of Arizona,” 255 which made such
conduct subject to discipline. In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted a Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, and
followed Arizona in defining as “unprofessional conduct” as
“substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of Admission to The
Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Professionalism, The
Florida Bar Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, The Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, or the decision of The Florida

253Report

No. 2 of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, 113(2) A.B.A. REP. 589,
589 (1988). See id. at 25 (adopting resolution).
254Proceedings of the 1988 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates,113(2) A.B.A.
REP. 4, 25 (1988).
255Regulation of the Practice of Law, Rule 31(a)2.E., Rules of the Supreme Court of
Arizona, 17A Ariz. Rev. Stats., Supreme Ct. Rules (2013). See Amelia Craig
Cramer, Linda Drake & Mariam Digging, Civility for Arizona Lawyer: Essential,
Endangered, Enforceable, 6 Phoenix L. Rev. 465, 482-83 (2013)(noting history of
amendment).
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Supreme Court.” 256 Thus, in those states the law of lawyering now
encompassed the Professionalism Creed.
A 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
intended “to deal with the abuses that undermined civility and
professionalism,” instead “may have contributed to further
undermining the public=s confidence in the profession as well.” 257
The goal of amended Rule 11 was to inculcate civility in civil
litigation. Its unintended consequence was “a deleterious effect on
lawyer relations.” 258 Concomitantly, the 1980s also saw a rise in
efforts to disqualify opposing counsel on conflict of interest
grounds. In his 1985 treatise Modern Legal Ethics, Charles
Wolfram wrote, “The motion for a judicial order disqualifying a
lawyer in pending litigation because of conflict is a traditional
remedy that has come into prominence in recent years.” 259 In
Texas, for example, appellate decisions on orders disqualifying
counsel on conflict of interest grounds were first issued in the late
1980s. 260 By the end of the 1980s lawyers began to write ruefully
about the deleterious consequences of “Rambo”-style litigation
tactics to the profession of law. While some such tactics might
violate enforceable rules, others simply made litigation even more
onerous and expensive, heightening the professionalism crisis. 261
In 1988, the Section on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of American Law Schools organized its annual
In re Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, 116 So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla.
2013)(Exhibit A Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints).
257Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 590 (1998).
See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A
Historical Perspective, 63 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 381 (2012).
258Vairo, Rule 11, at 627 (citing studies).
259Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.7 at 329 (2d ed. 1985). See
Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 677
(1997)(citing cases largely dating from the 1980s or later). See also William
Freivogel, A Short History of Conflicts of Interest. The Future, 20:2 PROF. LAWYER 3, 3
(2010)(“Twenty years is a good window, however, because most of the relevant
activity has taken place during that period.”).
260See Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1988); NCNB Tex.
Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1989).
261Sayler, Rambo Litigation; Paul Marcotte, Reining in Rambo, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989,
at 43; Bradley W. Foster, Comment, Playing Hardball in Federal Court; Judicial
Attempts to Referee Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 223 (1989);
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program around professionalism, 262 and the American Bar
Foundation held a Conference on Professionalism. 263 Courts and
bar associations also focused on professionalism. 264 The
professionalism crisis resulted in a flood of books 265 and articles 266
alternately regretting or fearing the shift of law from a profession
to a business. 267 And at least 140 state or local bar association
adopted some professionalism creed between 1986 and 2007. 268
In this maelstrom David Hoffman has served a purpose. He
is a reminder of a past in which ethics and morality were
intertwined, and both served the idea of law as a profession. He
also represented a past ideal of virtue ethics, in contrast to the role
morality of modern liberal legal ethics. Hoffman’s ethos was of
less interest to legal scholars than the fact that Hoffman served as a
symbol of a worthy tradition. Legal scholars often referred to his
Resolutions from the 1980s on, but ordinarily to support an
argument about a smaller or larger aspect of unprofessional lawyer
behavior, or about the moral qualities to be fostered in American
lawyers. Hoffman was used instrumentally by those who often
argued on non-instrumental grounds for a return to a past moral
“golden age.” On these grounds, the law of lawyering won both
the battle and the war.
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V. CONCLUSION
The debate on the Model Code continues, though the ABA,
through its Ethics 2000 Commission and later efforts, has largely
nibbled around the corners. 269 Inculcating virtuous conduct within
the American legal profession also continues, but again only in
small incremental fashion. The professionalism debate is neverending, though it is now considered in light of the impact of the
Great Recession on the American legal profession. A profession
constantly in crisis 270 faces another: what is it, and what is it to be?
(Or, what are lawyers to be, for the future may be several discrete
professions, a pluralistic society of lawyers.)
One possibly surprising lesson to take from Hoffman’s life
is to reject “declinist” thought. Hoffman’s fear of the rabble and
Jacksonian democracy (as well as personal loss) led him from the
legal profession. That fear may also have led to his insistence on
arguing in some of his Resolutions for a lawyering tradition that
never was, based on a professional exclusivity that was quickly
disappearing. Changes in the modern American legal profession
may result in decline, but such a result is not fated. 271
It may be that “[t]hings fall apart; the centre cannot
hold.” 272 Transformations of the legal profession have been taking
place for more than four decades, 273 and predictions of “major
transformations” “within the next decade or so” 274 are simply a
reminder that instability is a constant for lawyers.
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